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CHAPTER I
Foresight in Polities and the Case of Joseph McCarthy
Senator Joseph McCarthy was amongst the most colorful and, perhaps,
potentially dangerous political figures ever to have emerged in the United
States. Surprisingly little purely scholastic work ha6 been done concerning
this controversial figure. It is our aim to deal with a limited aspect of
1' affaire McCarthy for a relatively limited end. Namely, it is our intention
to deal with the final demise of McCarthy and to discern the reasons for this
demise. If, as we hope, it is possible to establish that a major threat to
the American political system, in the person of McCarthy, was dealt with too
late and too softly, there arises the question of how the situation could
have been better handled. Vie are thus brought to the question of providing
some possible guidelines for the future handling of a nouveau demagogue in
the McCarthy style. There are, of course, a number of questions implicitly
involved here which must be answered. Two are of particular relevance to us
at this state. First, is attempting to foresee and deal with future oc-
currences a legitimate function of political scientists? Second, can we be
at all certain that another McCarthy type figure will arise in the United
States? If the second occurrence is Improbable, then obviously the relevance
of the first question, in this instance, is, at the most, extremely limited.
Thus, at this stage, these two problems must be clarified and a solution
postulated.
2I. The Problems of Foresight and Values
Unless one takes a totally deterministic view of political life, it
would seem that the future is not ineluctably predestined. Further, if this
is the case, and we take a voluntaristic approach to the process of change in
our environment, then we must assume at least a limited ability to foresee, and
consequently deal with, future events. In democratic societies the belief that
we can change our systems for better or for worse is widely accepted. The very
fact that in the main we reject Marxist economic determinism is indicative of
our own attitudes to change in the world. Once this facet of democratic
thought is established, we have by no means reached a conclusion, since arising
from this proposition there is a question of whether we can effectually foresee
future events and thus adapt our society in the light of them. The political
scientist, in using historical knowledge, hopes to establish some framework for
future action.
Historical knowledge is a technique of the first order to preserve and
continue a civilization already advanced, liot that it affords positive
solutions to the new aspect of vital conditions — life is always differ-
ent from what it was — but that it prevents us committing the ingenuous
mistakes of other times. But if, in addition to being old and, therefore,
beginning to find life difficult, you have lost the memory of the past,
and do not profit by experience, then everything turns to disadvantage.
The fact that McCarthy is dead does not mean that the possibility for the
emergence of another such demagogue is a mere chimera: as we shall see later
in the chapter, the objective conditions for the rise of a new "McCarthy" are
by no means lacking.
Because the future is never stable, because there are inevitably
unforeseen events which obstruct our vision of it, the suggestion that we can
in a real sense predict it has been frequently brushed aside as wishful think-
ing.
^Ortega Y. Gasset, The Revolt of the Masses , (London: Onwin Books,
1961), p. 69.
To some extent, of course, man has always predicted the future, but there are,
at bottom, two types of prediction. First, there is what we may call Utopian-
universal prediction. This is the type of foresight which enables its author
to see the future in some sort of millenial view through a mechanism of
"absolute rationality". This is a point of view which has been widely associ-
ated with the work of such political theorists as Rousseau, Babeuf, Hegel,
Marx and others, who, while themselves not necessarily committed to the idea
of totalitarianism, did much to help establish it, 1 .Second, there is what we
may characterize as limited pragmatic prediction. This type of prediction is
concerned with limiting its scope to an area where sufficient relevant data
may be gathered to enable the investigator to predict the future with some
degree of confidence. This does not mean that the political scientist is
attempting to be omniscient. Bertrand de Jouvenal has written,
Foresight is an expertise required in the political scientist. ... i:eed
I stress that expertise lioes not mean infallibility? A political
scientist will often misread the course of events or miscalculate the
consequences of a decision, but the frequency of his successful forecasts
should be higher than that of the average politician or lay citizens
this is not a great deal to ask, and whoever denies that it can be
achieved, thereby denies any practical value to political research.2
De Jouvenal sees the political scientist as necessarily an expert In the field
of foresight) he should be able to foresee trouble to comej3 to obtain
foresight, political behavior must be studied;" "the political forecaster must
^See, for instance, J. L. Talaon, The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy ,
(Lonson: Seeker & Warburg, 1955), Part I, Chap. Ill E Part III chaps. I-II k
Chaps. IV & VI, and Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty , (London: Oxford
University Press, 1958), pp. 16-39,"117-57
2Bertrand de Jouvenal, "Political Science and Prevision", American
Political Science Review, Vol. LIX, (March, 1965), p. 29.
3Ibld . p. 32.
^Ibld. p. 33.
guess hov people will come to feel"1 ; lastly, "the political scientist should
foretell the adjustments suitable to improve the adequacy of the institutional
system to cope with changing circumstances."' As far as this author is con-
cerned, the final point made above is the most important, since it is, in the
final analysis, the objective of this thesis to study the fall of Joseph
McCarthy with the objective in mind of how better to deal with McCarthy types
in the future. There are, of course, many difficulties involved here which
should not be brushed over too lightly.
Prediction
. . .
involves the selection of past experiences which seem
relevant to the developing sequence of events .... Successful pre-
diction would thus be contingent on the reliability of significances
assigned to the world and on the ability to select from these sig-
nificances those relevant to what has not yet occurred.
Further,
... a prediction is, in a sense, always a guess .... Successful
prediction also depends on an ability to anticipate novelty and to not
assume permanence or undistorted sequences. Being bound by the past
will stand in the way of realistic anticipation of the future.
3
There are, perhaps, more important difficulties involved, difficulties of which
we are aware, and which we are hoping to avoid. The most important of these
possible pitfalls is that "predictions often have a wish-fulfilling character
which has been repeatedly established from public opinion data. 11 " Academics
tend to think that laymen are much more prone to this type of wishfulfillment
than they themselves are. For this reason, this author takes special note of
1Ibid. p. 37.
2Ibid. p. 38.
3nans H. Toch, "The Perception of Future Events: Case Studies in
Social Prediction", Public Opinion Quarterly , Vol. XXII, (Spring, 1958),
p. 58.
''Ibid, p. 62.
the comment of Douglas McGregor on this point.
It is commonly believed that the predictions of the laymen are largely
determined by wishful thinking, and that scientists and sophisticated
academicians are somehow immune to tide influence. The data of the
present study indicate that both of these suppositions may be in error. 1
Certain values have to be accepted in assessing dangers to democratic
forms of government. We trust that we may be value free in our analysis apart
from condoning certain basic values largely acceptable to the majority of
democratic people. The type of basic value judgement which will be subsumed in
this study will be, for example, that individuals should effectively control
those by whom they are ruled. Ke are aware that this is by no means an easy
task, but we believe with Christian Bay that "'polities' should refer to power,
but the term should also refer to some conception of human welfare or the public
good."2
Henry Steele Commager has said,
the case for freedom—especially the case for freedom of dissent and for
heterodoxy—rests not only on the familiar and fundamental arguments of
constitutional and natural rights, but on one other that is equally
persuasive, and that seems to me conclusive. That is the argument of
the pragmatic necessity for freedom.
3
We intend to show that the methods which were used to bring about the downfall
of Joseph McCarthy were, in their lateness and inadequacy, in danger, by
inference, of destroying freedom in any meaningful sense of the word, particu-
larly in the sense put forward by Commager above. Since freedom as defined by
Douglas McGregor, "The Major Determinants of the Prediction of Social
Events", Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, Vol. XXXIII, (April, 1938),
p. 195.
Christian Bay, "Politics and Pseudopolitics : A Critical Evaluation
of Some Behavioral Literature", American Political Science Review , Vol. LIX,
(March, 1965), p. UO.
•^ienry Steele Commager, Freedom , Loyalty , Dissent , (Kew Yorkj Oxford
University Press, 1951. )» p. 8.
Caunager is a pillar of the democratic form of government in the United
States, then McCarthy can be viewed as a grave threat to this system. The
fact that we esteem freedom on its pragmatic grounds is, in a sense, a value
judgement. If McCarthy put in operation a tendency to destroy this concept
of freedom, and, further, if the Congress faltered in its duty to effectively
deal with tliis threat, then it may be in order to suggest a more efficient
framework for dealing with such a political phenomenon as McCarthy. Again, we
are very much aware of the difficulties endemic in model building. As Kane
Toch has said, "Caution seems to be positively correlated with accuracy In
the prediction of future events." 1 In addition, Toch has pointed out that
where there is caution, people tend to make more than one prediction, or set
of causes which might produce a number of effects.' Thus there is no one
answer, and certainly no simple answer to political problems. The political
scientist who prescribes machinery to cope with future events must bear in
mind that his prescription is of little value if it is not accepted by the
politicians themselves, or at least seriously studied by them. Value judge-
ments are, then, inherent in any political schemata, whether made implicit or
explicit. It is not our concern to proceed on an extensive discussion of the
normative content of political science. It is, rather, our intention to take
a stand with those political scientists who believe that,
Even the most democratic governments are likely to come to a bad
end~to say nothing of the individuals living under them—unless they
learn to become at least as responsive to the basic needs of all their
citizens as they are to the most insistent wants of the various ar-
ticulate and influential interest groups and parties.
3
%BM H. Toch, loc. cit., p. 65.
2Ibid, p. 65.
^Christian Bay, loc. cit., p. 50.
Political ideas, however, are not by any means eternal truths. A8 Alfred
Cobban has written, "The view that our cherished political ideas may be
capable of dying will naturally meet with opposition, yet there is nothing
impossible in such a development." 1
It is the nature of prescription to Bake at least some basic value
connitaients. It must be borne in mind, however, that what ought to be must
not be allowed to exclude what is. Eut, again, there is even a danger in
stressing what is, lest we return to Hegelian concepts of what is ought to be.
We have every intention of rejecting this latter hypothesis, while attempting
not to fall into the error of stressing the nomative nature inherent in
prevision and prescription in political life. We should make explicit the
fact that we believe that if we can, to some extent, predict events, then we
should act upon such predictions.
II. Is the Bnergence of Another "McCarthy" Probable?
Assuming that we can to some extent predict the future, then we must
apply this theory to our particular problem. He are frequently, and ofter
incorrectly, told that history repeats Itself. This naive belief cannot be
sufficient justification for carrying out a study of McCarthy's fall. What has
to be established is that there are certain significances in the IcJarthy
affair which would lead us to conclude that a similar event might happen in
the future. In a broader sense, we may look at some currents of post-World
War II United States history and try to establish that some of the character-
istics of thi3 period may be indicative of a probable repeat of the McCarthy
phenomenon in national political life.
Alfred Cobban, "The Decline of Political Therory" , Political Science
Quarterly , Vol. UVIII, (Sept., 1953), p. 322.
Few would question the proposition that we are now in not onljr a
quantitatively different age than any previous epoch in history. Further we
believe that it has become an age which differs qualitatively from any previous
period. The reason for this is fundamentally simple; warfare as it may happen
between the two super powers of the world, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., would
be of such a nsture as to perhaps destroy a major part of the civilized world.
Moreover, the speed with which such a war could start bears absolutely no re-
semblance to those of the more limited types of the past. Nuclear capacities
have speeded up the processes by which we may destroy or be destroyed—men and
materiel no longer have to be moved before battle ensues. This situation has
led these two countries into a position of mutual readiness and suspicion, into
a period which we call the Cold War. What we are concerned to show is that the
nature of this hostility is liable to have important repercussions on the dom-
estic front, particularly in an open society like the United States. ".
. .
the
threats to individual freedom in an emerging state of chronic mobilization are
recognized as imperrilling some of the deepest traditions of the American body
politic." 1 When a country becomes security-conscious in peacetime, as the
United States has, there is an inherent possibility of a clash between what are
regarded as democratic ideals and what is necessary for national security, fre-
quently postulated in terms of loyalty. Robert E. Cushman has stated, "On the
debit side of the national civil liberty ledger one must list a number of fami-
liar and persistent denials of civil liberty, together with a number of new
threats and dangers which have arisen out of the Cold War and our almost path-
ological fear of Communism." Of these threats "the most serious
. . . stem
Harold 0. Lasswell, "Does the Garrison State Threaten Civil Rights?"
The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science , Vol
.
CCLXXV, ;.iay, 19Fl), p. 111.
from our nationwide and rapidly accelerating drive against Communism and other
forms of disloyalty and subversion."1 In addition Cushman has said, "American
public opinion has becoroe diseased with regard to the whole problem presented
by communism and disloyalty." 2 Admittedly this was written in 1951, but there
are many indications tliat the position has not changed substantially since this
time. It was in this atmosphere that McCarthy thrived. Now, if it is true
that the persistence of a "garrison sUte"3 is well established, whether as a
result of the hostility of Russia or China, or of both, to the United States,
then the likelihood cf another McCarthy phenomenon arising is, to say the least
a strong likelihood.
There are, it would seem, good grounds for supposing that the environment
which gave rise to McCarthy's antics is not lacking at the present time, nor,
as long as the Cold War persists, will it cease to exist.
In a future fraught with conplex social, economic, and diplomatic dilemmas,
future demagogues will probably find more untapped areas of ignorance,
prejudice, bigotry, and eraotionallau to exploit. With television and
other new means of mass communication, their voices and their faces may
invade any hcne in the United States and many abroad. Such professional
•men of the people' accordingly present a persistent problem which this
and future generations of Americans and peoples of other lands will be
forced to face. 1*
Thus, there would seem to be good reason to try to interpret the Wisconsin
Senator's fall in the hope that we may learn something for the future. It is
Robert E. Cushman, "American Civil Liberties in Kid-Twentieth Century"
,
Ibid , pp. 2-3.
2Ibid., p. 7.
^For an exposition of tlds concept see Harold D. Lasswell, "The
Garrison State", American Journal of Sociology
. Vol. XLVI, (Jan., 19L1),
PP. l»55-ij68.
"Reinhard II
.
Luthin, American Demagogues Twentieth Century
,
'°
] oucester, Mass.t Peter Smith, 1959.), pp. ix-x.
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our intention, therefore, to investigate the end of his political career,
and, more particularly his relatione with the executive and the legislature,
with a view to providing a framework for dealing with future McCarthy types.
Some space will be devoted to fitting McCarthy into the context of demagoguery
in America in the twentieth century, but the bulk of the study will concern
his actions vis-a-vis the two branches of government mentioned above. This
will, inevitably involve some investigation of the nature and composition of
Congress in the early 1950' I and a discussion of the moves that were made by
Congress to curb McCarthy. The role that President Eisenhower played must
also be studied; as the leader of the nation in the period of McCarthy's
heyday and fall, his attitudes toward McCarthy were of importance in molding
public and administration opinions. These historical studies, it must be
remembered, are only our concern in that we hope to be able to assign various
significances to some of their aspects in order to prescribe sone future
possible course, or alternative course, of action in dealing with future
McCarthy types.
11
CHAPTER II
McCarthy in Historical Perspective
We must now attempt to place Joseph McCarthy in seme meaningful historical
context. It will be our purpose in this chapter to try to establish some
reasons for bearing out an argument which seee McCarthy within a historical
continuum, but which at the same time sees him as a departure from pre-exLstent
patterns. As far as this study is concerned there is no intention of going
beyond the experience of the twentieth century. It is in this century, we be-
lieve, that the important events have taken place which are relevant to the
case of Senator McCarthy. More particularly must we look at the precedent of
one person, namely Huey Long, the "Kingflsh" of Louisiana. He is deserving of
study in connection with the McCarthy phenomenon mainly because he was the only
previous American demagogue who built up any sort of substantial national fol-
lowing. Long, of course, was assassinated before he could make an effective
national political challenge, so that much that night have been instructive for
us never occurred. Some may object that we should include William Jennings
Bryan among the nationally based demagogues. There is without doubt, some val-
idity in this claim. V/e would wish however to take a somewhat narrower meaning
of the word demagogue so that we may imply a body of men of whom McCarthy is
but one example. This may seem somewhat arbitrary, but, as T. D. Weldon has
said,
the search for the true or correct meaning or use of words and sentences
is a wild goose chase .... There are indeed no fixed immutable or essential
meanings or concepts, but for all that verbal usage at any given time
and for any given society is fairly stable and is not subject to the
arbitrary whims of individuals.
*
*T.D. Weldon, A Vocabulary of Politics (Baltimore i Penguin Books,
I960), page 28.
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In using a rather narrow meaning of the word demagogue, we do not feel that
we are stepping outside the bounds of IT. Weldon's framework. We believe,
therefore, that we may, without too much equivocation, use the following
definition: A demagogue
is a politician skilled in oratory, flattery, and invective; evasive in
discussing vital issues j promising everything to everybody; appealing to
the passions rather than the reasons of the public; and arousing racial,
religious, and class prejudices—a man whose lust for power without
recourse to principle leads him to seek to become a master of the masses.
1
This is only, it must be borne in mind, an operational definition for the limited
purposes of this study. "A definition," as Robert Dahl writes, "is, so to
speak, a proposed treaty governing the use of terms."2
I. The Historical Pattern of American Denagoguery
Fundamentally, our argument is that twentieth century American dema-
gogues have had much in common, and, with the notable exceptions of Long and
McCarthy, have had more or less predictable careers. At whom, therefore, must
we look, and what are the common characteristics of these particular political
actors?
We know that the relationship between bad economic conditions and
political unrest is very close. We need only look at the examples, extreme as
they may be, of the German Weimar Republic and 1917 Russia to see that the
claim bears looking at. Although it is not true that all American demagogues
have consistently ridden to power and influence on the back of economic
difficulty, a significant number have. Others have simulated economic unrest
TiUthin o£. cit. p. 3.
2Robert A. Dahl, Modern Political Analysis, (Englewood Cliffsj
Prentice-Hall Inc., 196I1), p. B.
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by appealing to the poorer elements in society through jeering at the wealthy
sectors, and blaming the ills of the nation upon these classes. Theodore G.
Bilbo, as Governor of Mississippi, wrote in an April 1910 manifesto, "The
fight between the classes and the masses, between the corporate influences and
the people is on!" 1 Another demagogue who voiced similar opinions to those
of Bilbo, was Frank Hague, the Mayor of Jersey City. In the early 1920's he
was uttering such battle-cries as "I stand with the people against corporations
like the Public Service. My record of office in Jersey City is one of labor
for the people against the corporations."2 Kot dissimilar was James K. Curley,
the Mayor of Boston a number of times before and after the Second World War,
who made political ammunition out of attacking the established Boston families,
using his invective to hold them up to ridicule.3 Both Huey and Earl Long
used the same economic appeal, sometimes voiced as an explicit class appeal,
sometimes more subtly in innuendo. Kuey Long, in his successful 1928
gubernatorial primary campaign, put forward "criticisms and promises merged
in an emotional appeal to the masses to overthrow the 'old gang 1 and the
corporations, and in an invitation to lowerclas6 whites to displace the ruling
alliance and grasp political power for themselves.» To a somewhat less
extreme extent, Earl Long made similar appeals in his campaigns,' and was
still making them in his final attempt to be elected governor in 1959. In
Quoted in Luthin op_. cit. p. 50.
2Quoted in Ibid
., p. 13l».
3ibld
. pp. 20-21
^Allan P. Sindler, Huey Long's Louisiana , (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
Press, 1956), p. 51i.
'For his 19l»8 campaign promises, see Ibid , p. 200.
11*
one speech in that year, he said,
We got the finest roads, finest schools, finest hospitals in the
country — yet there are rich men who complain. They are so tight you
can hear 'em squeak when they walk. They wouldn't give a nickel to
see a earthquake. They sit there swalloin' hundred-dollar bills like
a bullfrog swallows winners — if you chunked them as many as they
want they'd bust.
Liebling reports that an old man in the audience interjected, "Amen, Earl, God
have mercy on the poor people. **
The foregoing gives some impression of the emphasis put on some
basically crude questions of economics by these demagogues. We have mentioned
this problem at length because we contend that there is a marked comparison to
that of the appeal which McCarthy made to the people. We will deal with the
reasons for thiB and other differences between the majority of American dema-
gogues and Senator McCarthy at a later Juncture.
With the exception of Huey Long, demagogues in the twentieth century
United States have had almost exclusively regional appeal, confined to a
state or urban area. This is largely a function of the fact that local leaders
have a patronage machine which can be used to consolidate their positions.
Huey Long had such too, but he also had a national organization ^hich served
as the most important base for his national power ambitions. These were the
Share-Our-Wealth clubs which, while concentrated in the South and liorth-
Central states,2 were the nucleus for national influence.3 in 1935 "Long
claimed a total of 27,li31 clubs . . . while his staff claimed to possess the
**. J. Leibling, The Earl of Louisiana, (Hew lork: Ballantine Books,
1961), pp. 75-76.
^Sindler, op_. cit. p. 85.
^Luthin op_. cit . p. 315.
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names and addresses of over 7,500,000 persons on file." 1 It was pure
patronage, however, that was the fundamental factor in his control of the
state of Louisiana. In 1928 "it vas only through cajolery and patronage
that Long was able to persuade a majority of the Legislature to go along with
him".2 Similarly, Mayor William Hale Thompson of Chicago controlled his
position of power largely through patronage, not always, it must be added, to
the benefit of the city.3 The case was much the same for other regional dema-
gogues. "They (demagogues) hold on by building themselves a political machine
and running it."'1
Whether the demagogue controlled a city, as Curley, Hague and Thompson
did, or whether he controlled a state, as the Longs, 3ilbo and Eugene Talaadge
did, the prospects for moving to political dominance on a wider scale were
slim, since the political sub-structure for doing so was absent. This is not
to say that these species of political life are Incapable of gaining national
support, but rather that their appeal is too narrow to do so, since they must
rely on emotional factors which cannot be advantageously scaled up to the
national level. Rabid appeals to race and religion, 5 which have characterised
the operations of all of the demagogues of whom we have talked, are more of a
handicap than a help on the national political scene. The same can be said of
modes of dress and behavior which tend to be local in flavor and thus political
aids, but which on the national level often appear merely bisarre.
'sindler op_. cit . p. 85.
2Ibid. pp. 57-58.
^Luthin oj>. cit . pp. 85-86.
"Frank R. Kent, "Our Political Monstrosities", The Atlantic Monthly ,
Vol. CLI (April, 1933), p. h09.
%ithin, op_. cit. p. 302.
^bid. p. 303.
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Of the demagogues of whom we have spoken, Huey Long is the single one
who had both pretensions to national power and some, albeit rather crude,
means to implement his ambitions. As wt have observed, we will never know
how effective the Share-Our-Wealth clubs might have been in Long's drive for
national power, since he was assassinated in 1935, just at the point at which
his national movement was getting under way. 1 Given that Long's appeal was,
as was the case with the other demagogues we have mentioned, mainly economic
in nature, it would seem that Franklin Roosevelt's program would have taken
much of the impetus out of Long's simplistic plans. 2 It is notable, too,
that Long did not effectively use his position in the Senate to create a wider
basis for popular appeal. His antics in this house^ were more likely to produce
scorn than serious consideration, particularly on the part of his Senatorial
colleagues. Despite this, James A. Farley is stated to have been very worried
by Long's strength as it might have been used at the 1936 election. Huey Long
could have had considerable national support and financing if he had run in
the 1936 election.'4 But his national political potential was never to be
tested since his death intervened.
Long was an exception to the main trends in demagoguery in the United
States in that he was, at least to some extent, a nationally based leader.
There is therefore, some parallel with the case of Joseph McCarthy who has been
1Murray Clark Havens, The Challenges to Democracy , (Austin: University
of Texas Press, 1965), p. 56.
2A brief exposition of this viewpoint is in Ibid , p. 57.
For a precis of Long's plans, see Sindler op_. cit. p. 81).
3See Luthin p£. cit. pp. 252-25lu
"Richard Kofstadter, The American Political Tradition , (New York:
Vintage Books, 1958), p. 337.
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called "our first and only national demagogue. nl But, we think, the ways in
which McCarthy differed from not only Long, but also from his other precursors,
are more important than the similarities which existed among them. We must,
therefore, attempt to explain this dichotomy.
II. Divergence from the Historical Pattem—KcCarthy 's Uniqueness
We have already put forward the argument that the emergence of a new
McCarthy type in American political life is likely.2 What we must now establish
is that McCarthy is different in some important ways from most of his predeces-
sors in American demagoguery. This may, in some instances, overlap with what
we have said previously, but we believe that it is necessary to locate McCarthy
in his historical setting thoroughly, even if it has to be done at the expense
of a limited amount of repetition.
We live in a markedly different age from that of preceding epochs. We
are aware that there is a danger of erosion of civil liberties from Cold War
situations--either in a "Garrison State" or an "Amphlbial State", that is one
which is neither totally free nor totally garrison.3 D.F. Fleming has suggested
that civil liberties may become limited in either of two ways; first, if another
serious economic depression should take place; second, through a slow process
of erosion.k The whole problem, he maintains, is one tied up with the possi-
^ichard H. Rovere, Senator Joe McCarthy (New lorki Harcourt, Brace &
Co., 1959), p. 259.
2Supra, pp. 7-9.
3j. Malcolm ;imith and Cornelius P. Cotter, "Freedom and Authority in the
Amphibial State", Midwest Journal of Political Science , Vol. I, (May, 1957),
pp. I4O-I1I.
^D. F. Fleming, "Are We Moving Toward Fascism?", Journal of Politics ,
Vol. XVI (February, 1951), p. Wi. See, however, Walter Berns, "Freedom and
Loyalty", Journal of Politics , Vol. XVIII (February, 1956), pp. 17-27. Berns
argues that in dealing with disruptive elements in democratic society it may
be quite in order to censor individuals quite extensively.
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bility that we are moving, in the United States, toward Fascism, characterized
as "an effort to erect a secure fortress for a capitalist social structure by
i,«Hne Communist methods".
1 Thus, it is evident that 6uch was not the situation
for most other American demagogues of the twentieth century. They lived in an
epoch when appeal to more collective elements in economic life was made.
McCarthy, however, lived in a prosperous society in which it was well-nigh
impossible to make populist-type economic appeals, but where there was another
factor which could provide grist for his mill. Tills factor was the Communist
threat, a problem of national proportions which awaited an unscrupulous exploiter
at the national level. McCarthy thus had, readymade, an issue which, by and
large, wes not sectarian in nature.2 In a campaign speech made in 1952, McCarthy
made it quite clear to whom he was appealing and on what subject. "There is,"
he said, "only one real issue for the farmer, the laborer, and the businessman—
the issue of Communism in government."3 It was an issue firmly implanted in
the heads of American individuals throughout the land, people who were
genuinely frightened of the threat of Communism, and who might well be sus-
ceptible to play on that theme. Senator McCarthy was in a position, therefore,
to exploit a national issue for his own ends in a way that would appeal, po-
tentially, to a greater audience than any previous issue could hav a done for
his precursors.
As we have observed, most of the demagogues we have mentioned built
their power on the basis of an urban or state political machine of which they
^-Fleming loo. clt . p. Ul.
2An attempt to show how and why McCarthy appealed to many classes and
ethnic groups will be made in the next chapter. The chapter will deal, overall,
with the sources of McCarthy's support.
^Quoted in Rovere, 0£. cit. p. Ll.
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were the boss. 1 This can hardly be said of McCarthy. "llcCarthyisu," RoTtre
has remarked, "had no real grit and substance as a doctrine and no organization.
"
2
In one sense, this nay have been a distinct advantage for McCarthy in his
drive for national recognition. Unlike other demagogues, he was not sullied
with the work of a corrupt political organization, often built upon unscrupu-
lous use of patronage which had its manifestation in inefficient or corrupt
government, or both. This was, of course, as far as the general population
was concerned, an attraction in dealing with what eventually became to some
people a moral c.uestion.^
When we look into the background of twentieth century American
demagogucry, it becomes evident that the methods available to demagogues to
transmit their messages have changed in the last forty years, out of all
recognition. What has caused this? The answer lies in the emergence of
sophisticated new mass media techniques apart from the printed word, namely,
radio, filn and, more recently, television. The demagogue of yesteryear could
talk on the stump to specialized ethnic or religious audiences making sectarian
appeals to each. This was possible, of course, because, even accounting for
newspaper coverage, news was not suddenly available in easily digestible form
to everyone. If it had been, promising everything to everyone would have
becase a danger that could not be risked. 3ut, "With the development of
television the American demagogue has a new medium. Yet the demagogue also
takes the risk that he may be seen and heard by too many people who may come
•'supra, pp. Ili-l5.
2
Eovere cj>. cit. p. 20. (emphasis added.)
^The propensity of the American people for transforming political
questions into moral questions will be dealt with in the next chapter.
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to know and see through him."1 Richard Hofstadter lias written, "the growth
of bbbs Media of communication and their ubo in politics have brought politics
closer to the people than ever before cud have made politics a form of
entertainment in which spectators feel themselves involved."2 McCarthy, then,
had available a means of communicating with the people which was quite unlike
any previous type of news media. Television offered the sii^plest way in which
to get into American hones) the maximum use of it, as far as McCarthy was
concerned, was during the Army-McCarthy hearings in 195u. Television waa,
however, as rauoi. of a disadvantage as an advantage for the Senator—although
it gave him more exposure on a national level, it was this very exposure which
contributed to his eventual fall.
*
Accounting for the fact that television wa6 a new medium through which
a demagogue could ccrammicate, it remains that McCarthy used the oldest establish-
ed form of mass media to reach bis audience—tlie newspaper. The fact that be
knew the potential power of newspapers does not set him aside from otiier dema-
gogues, many of whan started tlieir own,'* but liis handling of them does make him
a deviant from the established pattern.
The fuel for (McCarthy's) engine was printer's ink. McCarthy captured
the headlines and held them in a vise of continuing and startling
accusations for nearly five years. There was a McCarthy story almost
every day, certainly several every week. Almost everything he said
and did was news in every paper across the country.
-
His habit of constantly appearing in the headlines was achieved by such devices
1tuthin, og. cit. p. 311.
2Richard Hof3tadter, "The Psuedo-Conservative Revolt" in Daniel Bell
(Ed.) The New American Right , (New Torki Criterion Books, 1955), P. 52.
3a full treatment of the Army-McCarthy hearings will be given in a
later chapter.
^Luthin, o£. cit. pp. 310-311.
^David T. Bazelon in the "Introduction" to Eraile de Antonio and Daniel
Talbot, Point of Order, (New Yorks W. W. Norton, Inc., 19oli), p. 6.
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as calling a morning press conference to announce an afternoon press con-
ference. The results, as Richard Rovere has pointed out, would be a headline
in both the afternoon and the following morning's editions of the newspapers.
The afternoon headlines might read, "NEW MCCARTHY REVELATIONS AWAITED IN
CAPITAL", and if McCarthy had some news he would reveal it, but if he did not,
then he would claim that he was still working on it. The following morning's
headline might then read, "DELAY SEEN IN NEW MCCARTHY CASE—MYSTERY WITNESS
BEING SOUGHT". 1
The press was manipulated extremely sucessfully by McCarthy—he did not
need his own newspaper to receive sufficient coverage. This sets him aside
from his precursors in the art of demagoguery, and adds to his uniqueness.
McCarthy was aware of to what extent he could afford to be different, and to
what extent it was incumbent upon him to conform. This is well illustrated in
the trademark which like all other demagogues he adopted. McCarthy's was the
"bulging briefcase". "The bulging briefcase", writes Rovere, "—the scholar's
toolbox—became to him what snapping red galluses and a stream of tobesco juice
were to the older Southern demagogues." 2 This was not a bizarre trade-markj on
the contrary it was eminently respectable and impressive. McCarthy had chosen
well to adapt to his circumstances and to the threat with which he was concerned.
In concluding, we must not forget one further technique which was used
by McCarthy that sets him apart from the traditional American demagogue. This
was his use of the "multiple untruth".
The 'multiple untruth' need not be a particularly large untruth but can
instead be a long series of loosely related untruths, or a single untruth
with many facets. In either case, the whole is composed of so many parts
that anyone wishing to set the record straight will discover that it is
utterly impossible to keep all the elements of the falsehood in mind at
Rovere 0£. cit., p. 161;.
2Ibid., p. 168.
the same time. Anyone making the attempt may seise upon a few selected
statements and show them to be false, but doing this may leave the
impression that only the statements selected are false and that the
rest are true. An even greater advantage of the 'multiple untruth 1 is
that statements shown to be false can be repeated over and over again
with impunity because no one will remember which statements have been
disproved and which haven't.
Earlier demagogues had certainly told lies, but not in the same manner nor
with the same results that McCarthy did.2 His technique was essentially a
departure from previous demagogic practies—it was a refinement of Hitler's
"Big Lie," and was, of course, used to great effect by McCarthy.
Joseph McCarthy was, we believe, an exception in the general pattern of
American demagoguery. The different techniques which he used to amass a follow-
ing were a function of the age in which he lived, reflected in new used of mass
media and, more especially, in the issue upon which he landed—that of the
internal threat of Communism. In the final analysis, McCarthy was indicative
of an emerging epoch, an epoch that is seeing the rise of new and/or latent
forces in politics which provided the basis for his support. If we are to deal
with future McCarthy types effectively, we must know from what sources their
support may come. It is to this question that we must now turn.
ilbid., p. 110.
2For a description of how Rovere himself was subjected to the "multiple
untruth" treatment, see Ibid , pp. 112-118.
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CHAPTER III
McCarthy's Sources of Support
I. An Era of Increased Conservatism
Few would deny that the last fifteen years has seen a resurgence of
conservatism in American politics. We must be somewhat careful, however, in
identifying the reasons for this renaissance, for the sense in which we have
referred to conservatism here is very broad in scope. Clinton Rossiter has
identified three major categories into which one may divide the contemporary
Right j the ultra-conservatives, who are represented by such figures as Strom
Thrumond, Bruce Alger and "their defunct Galahad", Joseph McCarthys the
middling-conservatives, represented by persons such as Eisenhower and Taft in
the centre and Dewey and Nixon at the periphery} finally, the liberal con-
servatives, made up, for example, of such men as Earl Warren, Nelson Rockefeller
and Arthur Larson.1 Rossiter succintly summarizes how McCarthy stood vis-a-
vis each of these groups in the following manner i "of Senator McCarthy the
ultra-conservative said proudly, 'That's ray boyl', the middling conservative
uneasily, 'Joe is a little rough, but he gets results', the liberal conserva-
tive queasily, 'He's a disgrace to American democracy and a disaster to American
Prestige.'"2 (At a later stage in the chapter we will explain why it was that
Clinton Rossiter, Conservatism in America, (Hew York: Alfred A Knopf,
1962), pp. 170-175.
2Ibid, p. 175.
For another indication that McCarthy attracted the support of the
ultra-conservatives, see Rovere op_. cit. pp. 20-21.
aMcCarthy attracted the support of the ultra-conservative, and, further, what
people comprise this particular conservative grouping.)
Dwight Eisenhower had been elected President in 1952. This was in-
terpreted as a turn to the moderate right in American politics, as symptomatic
of the emergence of a new political atmosphere. As Samuel Lubell has written,
"In essence the drama of his Eisenhower's/ Presidency can be described as the
ordeal of a nation turned conservative and struggling. . .to give effective
voice and force to the conservatism."-1' As for the reasons for this veering to
the right, Rossiter, writing five years later than Lubell, had this to say,
A nation that considers itself a success and finds itself under attack
lias little use for progressive reform and none at all for radical
ferment. Small wonder, then, that America's present mood displays an
obstinate streak of conservatism. Our triumphs are soured with frus-
tration, our prosperity with apprehension, our taste for peace with
preparations for war. We are all more conservative than we were a
generation ago. Even the reformer, the man with his heart in the
future, is heard to speak the language of tradition, loyalty, order, and
preservation.
2
Whereas we may not fully agree with this statement, we do believe that it is
indicative of an overall trend in America at the present time. To repeat,
Conservatism is a greater political force today than it was a few years ago.
Norman Phillips, writing in 1956, expressed the position of a number of the
intelligentsia in this wayi "To many thoughtful writers and men of affairs,
this has been pre-eminently an era of great uncertainty and growing cynicism.
In skepticism many of them observe the intellectual expression of this mood
—
the distilled essence of the spirit of the age. "3 From here Phillips goes on
Isamuel Lubell, The Revolt of the Moderates , (New Yorki Harper and
Bros., 1956), pp. 3-1*.
2Rossiter, og. cit. p. 163.
%orman R. Phillips, "The Conservative Implications of Skepticism",
Journal of Politics, Vol. XVIII, (Feb., 1956), p. 28.
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to develop a thesis which sees skepticism as desirable, 1 and which proposes
that, "the skeptic, if he is to be logically consistent, should be a con-
servative."2
We have felt it necessary to establish our's as an epoch of increasing
conservotdsn because we believe that McCarthy drew ouch of his support from
aen and women of this political inclination, most of whom were extremists,
some of whom were not. To some large extent McCarthy's success rested upon
these sources of support. These wells of encouragement and maintenance for
McCarthy did not simply dry up when he died. They are, indeed, as we propose
to show, still with us, scnetiBes covert, sometimes overt. The reasons for
dsaagoguery in general are not, unfortunately, as simple as Frank Kent would
have us believe, that is, merely a result of appeal to an uncivilizable,
illiterate "moronic underworld," the emotions of which can easily be preyed
upon. 3 The particular case of Joe McCarthy is even more complex than the run
of the mill demagogue. Besides being the manifestation of a political problem,
he was, too, a reflection of deep-seated sociological and psychological factors.
To explain McCarthy in terms of what conservatism has meant historically
in the United States is not enough, for, if we may return to Rossiter for a
Whatever else it was, McCarthyis* was not conservatism, and ultra-con-
servatives, by their own proud admission, were the most loyal soldiers
in McCarthy's ranks. The demagoguery of the Right is no more akin to
upright conservatism than the demagoguery If the Left is to decent
liberalism, and too many ultra-conservatives have shown themselves much
too willing to forgive, to encourage, and often even to practice the
disruptive arts of pseudo-conservative extremism.'*
ilbid., pp. 33-38.
2Ibid., p. 32.
3Frank R. Kent, loc . cit. p. h06.
"Rossiter, op_. cit ., pp. 177-176.
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McCarthy was part of a conservative movement without being wedded to an
American philosophy of conservatism. For the most part, his appeal generated
support from the extremities of such intellectual movements, and sometimes
from nearer their centers, but much less frequently. It was precisely the
periphery of the movement which had little, or no interest in the American
conservative tradition. What follows is a partial explanation of why this was,
and still is, so.
II. Psychological and Sociological Foundations of Support
A. The Problems of Alienation and Status
Since the latter half of the eighteenth oentury and the early part of
the nineteenth century, social scientists have had an abiding interest in the
problem of alienation. There is, of course, a wide gulf between the concepts
of alienation which exist in Rousseau, Hegel and Marx, and those which appear
in the writings of Talcott Parsons, Seymour Martin Lipset and other contempo-
raries. Although this difference exists, there is certainly a perception
conaon to these social scientists which papers over sane of tfco divisive
factors. The central point which joins them together is that of man isolated
from society, however we may conceive this latter word.
Marx and Hegel see
a long process of social, intellectual and moral change leading man
steadily but inevitably to the condition where he understands him-
self and the world,
In this condition man is at long last no longer 'alienated" but is at
peace with himself, is 'whole' and morally secure in his 'wholeness',
because he is 'at home' in the social world which is both the product
and the sphere of his activities.1
^John Plamenatz, Man and Society, (London j Longmans, Green, 1963),
Vol. II, p. 105.
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Marx ascribes nan's alienation from society to the bourgeois aystea under which
he lives. Bourgeois society sets men apart from each other by conceiving of
then as atone, which stresses the individual at the expense of the community.
Man could, therefore, only overcome this alienation by breaking down bourgeois
society and thus finding himself re-integrated in a cowmunity, as essentially
part of society.!
The problems that man faces in being isolated from his community need
not lead to wholesale condemnation of that community and the demand for it to
be overthrown. Rattier, alienation is seen as a problem which faces all societies,
and which, if the society is not to collapse, must, in some measure, be solved.
America, as we will show, is not an exception to other societies in this matter.
Political alienation certainly exists and is a powerful source of support for
the ultra-rightists in the United States. 2
Alienation is experienced in varying forms and degrees of intensity
when certain forces block the individuals quest for so-called authentic,
or true, existence, when he feels unable to shake off a sense of cleavage,
of an abyss, within himself, and between himself and other men. At
bottom, the alienated man is convinced that he is unable to assume what
he believes to be his rightful role in society.3
Abcarian and Stanage identify four major variables in "the general concept of
alienation", meaninglessness, normlessness, powerlessness and social isolation,'*
which permeate many of the ultra-rightists' views and feelings. McCarthyisei,
3a. James Gregor, A Survey of Marxism
,
(Hew Yorki Random House, 1965),
pp. 190-191.
2
Indications of alienation on the left are evident too. See, for
instance, Charlie Cobb, "Whose Society is This?" Hew Republic , Vol. CLIII,
(Dec. IS, 1965), pp. 13-15 and Robert Coles, The Search for Community,
Kew Republic Vol. CUV, (Feb., 26, 1966), pp. 12-U*.
-^Gilbert Abcarian and Serman M. Stanage, "Alienation and the Radical
Right," Journal of Politics Vol. XXVII, (Nov. 1965), p. 78h.
^Ibid
., pp. 785-788.
Lipset has written, makes an appeal to much the same kind of people aa
Pou^adiem, Italian Fascism and German and Austrian Nazism did, people "who
feel cut off from the main trends of modern society. 1'1 But what kind of people
are those who are alienated in society?
There are several sources of this alienation which gives vent to ultra-
conservatism In America, arising largely from stresses and strains which produce
many sorts of status anxiety.^ Economic upheaval has played a large role here.
The smaller business enterprises, private corporations and the newly wealthy
tend to feel oppressed because they find it difficult to deal with the managed
economy, whereas large corporations tend to welcome it as producing increased
stability and predicatability.-*
Another source of ultra-conservatism has been religious in nature, and
again ties in with the manifestation of alienation in American society. It is
primarily the evangelical Prostestant minority among religious denominations
which renders support to ultra-conservative forces. These are groups which
have seen their influence diminishing and which have become increasingly
hostile to trends in society which, they contend, are undermining their faith.
«.
.
.many of them /evangelical Protestants/ do identify with a politics of
retrogression, an effort to return to 19th-century values."'*
Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man , (Garden City: Doubleday, 1963),
p. 172.
2Hofstadter, loc. cit., pp. Ij.-h2.
^Seymour Martin Lipset, "Beyond the Backlash", Kncountor , Vol. XXIII,
(Nov., 196U), pp. 18-19. See also, Seymour iiartin Lipset, "The Sources of the
'Radical Right'", in Bell (ed.) 0£. cit., p. 195.
"Lipset, loc . cit ., ( Encounter) p. 16.
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It has also been postulated that some old-established families and
emerging ethnic groups feel the pressures of alienation. 1 The latter, wishing
to feel totally Americanized and accepted in society, and finding that this
objective may be forbidden them, become alienated. The divergence between the
myth of the "American way" and the harsher realities of life encourages dis-
illusionment, but it can also encourage extreme demonstrations of patriotism in
order to prove loyalty to America and, thus, genuine assimilation. 2 (It will
not be lost on the reader that McCarthy was rabid in his appeal to patriotism.)
Similarly, the old-established families feel themselves isolated in a newly
emerging social situation, and tend, by way of defense, to hark back to the
past.
3
McCarthy's attacks were directed against the "establishment'' in American
society, against those who were assimilated in the "American way of life".'*
Whether McCarthy knew it or not, he drew support from, and appealed to, the
alienated in society, to those with status anxieties. As sociologists have
suggested, a major structural change in society will set up anxieties and
tensions, and there will be desire for retrogression to a situation prior to
the arrival of the disturbances.? "McCarthyism" , writes Parsons,
Can be understood as a relatively acute symptom of the strains which
accompany a major change in the situation and structure of American
society, a change which in this instance consists in the development
^pset, loc . cit., (Bell (Ed.) op_. cit .) p. 193.
2Lubell, op_. cit
., pp. 8O-8I1.
^Lipset, loc. cit., (Bell(Ed.) op_. cit.) p. 195.
^Ibid
., pp. 210-211. Lipset, loc. cit. (Encounter) pp. 16-17.
'Talcott Parsons, "Social Strains in America", in Daniel Bell (Ed.)
op_. cit . p. 127.
of the attitudes and institutional machinery required to implement a
greatly enhanced level of national political responsibility. 1
Apart from the sociological aspects of McCarthyism we have dealt with
above, there are other, perhaps more important, factors which determine the
kinds of support which might be available to a future McCarthy. One facet of
McCarthy's support can be interpreted psychologically, and, while we are aware
of the close connexion between the psychological and sociological factors, we
believe that the former deserve some treatment of their own.
B. The Problems of Authoritarianism and Paranoia with Reference to
Conservatism
(a) Anti-Intellectualiem
When we cast our minds back to twentieth century demagogues prior to
McCarthy, we find that they had, amongst other things, a peculiar and some-
what disturbing common characteristic. All shared an anti-intellectual
outlook. Governor 3ilbo of Mississippi could work bis followers into such a
frenetic state that, at his instigation, they would shout, "We are the low-
brows, we are the red-necks." 2 One more example, that of William Hale Thompson,
will suffice to bear out this common attribute. In 1927 Thompson had been
attacked by all the newspapers except the Hearst group in hi6 campaign for the
Chicago mayoralty. In the same year, in a campaign speech, Thompson raged
against the University of Chicago, social workers and others, proclaiming to
his audience, "They call you low-brows and hoodlums. We low-brows have got
to stick together. Look who is against usj"3
McCarthy, as we shall see, certainly did play on similar emotions to
J-Ibid
., pp. 117-118.
2Quoted in Luthln og. cit., p. It?.
3Cuoted in Ibid. pp. 77-78.
those which provided fuel for other demagogues' fire, but it was in a somewhat
different way. Levels of education had risen appreciably since the death of
Kuey Long and the rise of McCarthy, and, we contend they had produced something
of a novel situation in American life. We have talked of McCarthy's use of the
"multiple untruth", and it is this technique which is closely attached to the
educational level of the early 1950's. McCarthy claimed to have reams of
evidence (in the "bulging briefcase") which many people considered to be tanta-
mount to proof of wliatever it was that he was attempting to prove. Rovere has
pointed out that American education, with its emphasis on facts, inclines people
to "take the synbol of the fact as proof of the fact."1 This is germane to our
discussion of psychological factors in that it once more offers us a picture
of McCarthy's adaptability to traditional demagogic modes of appeal in the light
of modern social and political developments. McCartiiy retained the semblance
of anti-intellectualisra while aleo providing the relatively well-educated people
with enough "information" to provide credibility for his allegations. As
David Rieswan and Nathan Olaaer have pointed out, "many of those who have swamped
the colleges have acquired there, and helped their families learn, a half-
educated resentment for the traditional intellectual values some of their
teachers and schootaates represented."2 This attitude of anti-intellectualism,
however manifested, has relevance to the conservative cause in the United
States. Rossiter has written that,
the American Right has displayed an attitude of anti-intellectualism that
goes far beyond the quisiical suspicion that most conservatives seem to
have for men whose business is thinking rather than doing. The American
conservative has not merely distrusted the poet, professor, philosopher,
Rovere, op_. clt . p. 169.
2David Rleeman and Nathan Glaser, "The Intellectuals and the Discontented
Classes", in Daniel Bell (Ed.) 0£. clt . p. 68.
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and political theorist} he has scorned them, bullied them and not
seldom despised them. 1
Why should the existence of anti-intellectualism concern us in connection
with psychological roots of support for McCarthy? The answer lies in the
attributes of authoritarianism and its relationship to conservatism. What we
now intend to show, is that authoritarian personality types, frequently of anti-
intellectual and anti-national tendency, offered support for McCarthy and will
continue to offer support for McCarthy types in the future.
(b) McCarthy and the "Authoritarian Personality"
In ccoEOr. sense language, the authoritarian is the individual who is
concerned with power and toughness and who is prone to resolve conflict
in an arbitrary manner. i:e is seen as having strong and persistent desires
that others submit to his outlook. Social psychology in recent years has
added the observation that the authoritarian person has another powerful
desire of which he is not fully aware. He himself desires to submit to
other individuals whom he sees as more powerful.
'
We believe, as we hope subsequent evidence will indicate, that the authoritarian
person tends to exist in greater numbers amongst the types of people who
supported Senator McCarthy, or who might support a future McCarthy type. We
are, we admit, of democratic persuasion, and we thus see in the authoritarian
a very real, but for the most part latent, threat to democratic government.
Janowiti and Karvick, using a nation-wide survey technique, demonstrated
some important aspects of the authoritarian individual. Older people tend to
be more authoritarian than younger people, and the lees well-educated more
authoritarian than the better-educated.3
'Rosaiter, op_. cit. p. 213
2Morris Janowitz and Dwaine Marvick, "Authoritarianism and Political
Behavior", Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. XVII, (Summer, 1953), p. 185.
3lbid., p. 191. For the method of measuring authoritarian tendencies,
see Ibid., pp. 188-190.
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In class terms, the lower classes tend to be more authoritarian than the
upper classes, with the lower lower classes the most authoritarian and the
lower middle classes the next in degree of authoritarian tendencies. 1
This finding is echoed by Upset.
The lower class individual is likely to have been exposed to punishment,
lack of love, and a general atmosphere of tension and aggression since
early childhood—all experiences which tend to produce deep-rooted
hostilities expressed by ethnic prejudice, political authoritarianism,
and chiliastic transvaluational religion.
"
Perhaps the most interesting findings in this connection are those which are
closely related to the sociological factors we have discussed above. "A con-
sistent pattern of authoritarian responses is
. . .
seen as a mode for the
release of tensions created in persons who have accepted the goals of our
society but who find it difficult to adapt to the democratic processes by which
they are achieved. "3 Abcarian and Stanage found that the Radical Right was
strongly disposed toward feel: ngs of powerlessness and normlessness in its
ideology." There is, therefore, reason to believe that those who are alienated
from society respond to the problem in an authoritarian manner. Even those
who are apolitical, or who have low incidences of political activity in terrs
of voting patterns, tend to be more authoritarian in outlook than those who
are politically active.
^
"ibid., pp. 191-193.
2Lipset, Political Kan
, p. Hit.
^Janowitz and Marvick loc
. cit
., p. 197. A similar finding is in
Charles D. Farris, "'Authoritarianism' as a Political Behavior Variable",
Journal of Polities , Vol. XVIII, (Feb., 1956), p. 75.
"Abcarian and Stanage, loc . cit . pp. 791-7P2.
'janowitz and Marvick, loc . cit
., p. 199. A contrary finding is in
Bernard Hennessy, "Politicals and Apoliticals: Some Measurements of Personality
Traits", Midwest Journal of Political Science , Vol. Ill, (Nov., 1959),
p. 3U6.
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The best summary of the problem with which we deal hers can be found
stated by Farris who sees his "authoritarian respondent" 1 as
a working class person, in middle age or over. The economy is threaten-
ing. He exj acts prices to rise, and unemployment to increase. He
dislikes Negroes. Although he professes great self-interest in elections,
he is a politically ignorant, politically inactive person, who has
little belief in his ability to influence the course of politics. When
he responds positively to political figures, the objects of his choice
are not moderates but a man of the far Right, like Senator McCarthy, or
of the populist 'left' like Governor Folsom.*
The authoritarian is, then attracted to extremist solutions in politics, and,
as far as we are concerned, the most important of these extremes is the ultra-
right. McClosky has Indicated the closeness of feelings of isolation with
those of conservatism. "Conservatism," he writes,
in our society at least, appears to be far more characteristic of
social isolates, of people who think poorly of themselves, who suffer
personal disgruntlement and frustration, who are submissive, timid, and
wanting in confidence, who lack a clear sense of direction and purpose,
who are uncertain about their values, and who are generally bewildered
by the alarming task of having to thread their way through a society
which seems to them too complex to fathom.
3
(c) The Question of Paranoia
In addition to those psychological propensities of some Americans that
we have observed up to this point, we should devote some space to discussing
the question of paranoia, or quasi-paranoia, which appears to exist amongst the
ultra-Rightists in America. The manifestation of some form of paranoia,
however, is not something which is found in the American political system alone.
If we conceive of paranoia, as Hofstadter does, we would view it not in its
*See Farris loc. cit., p. 66. His measurement of authoritarianism
is somewhat differenTTrom that of Janowit* and Karvick, loc. cit., p. 188.
2Farris, loc. cit ., p. 71.
^Herbert McClosky, "Conservatism and Personality", American Political
Science Review , Vol. LI, (March, 1958), p. 37.
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clinical psychological sense, but would see it, rather, as a word suitably
operational to describe a "sense of heated exaggeration, suspiciousness, and
conspiratorial fantasy." 1 The "paranoid style" is of particular importance
to us not only because it has been associated with American politics, and with
McCarthy, amongst other politicians, but also because it has had relevance to
anti-democratic movements elsewhere in the world.
In June of 1951, Joseph HcCarthy was saying,
How can we account for our present situation unless we believe that men
high in this government are concerting to deliver us to disaster? This
must be the product of a great conspiracy on a scale so immense as to
dwarf any previous such venture in the history of man. A conspiracy of
infamy so black that, when it is finally exposed, its principals shall
be forever deserving of the maledictions of all honest men. ...
McCarthy referred, then, to a conspiracy which existed within the government,
but a conspiracy which was attached at the same time to world-wide communism.
The plot on the home front was little more than a facet of a plot of global
dimensions, but for McCarthy the former was more important than the latter.
"He even insisted", writes Rovere, "that the struggle against world Communism
was a diversion from the struggle against the domestic conspiracy. "3 Hofstadter
indicates that this type of manipulation of paranoid fears by McCarthy was
part of a historical characteristic in the United States, of which the modern
ultra-Right is an extension."
The extreme right in the United States, we believe, finding itself
isolated from society, will attach blame somewhere for the condition in which
^Richard Hofstadter, "The Paranoid Style in American Politics", Harpers ,
Vol. CCECIX, (Nov., 196U), p. 77.
2Cuoted in Ibid
., p. 77.
^Rovere, op_. clt
., p. Ul.
hofstadter, loc . cit ., ( Harpers ) pp. 78-81.
it rinds itself.
Externally the world Communist movement is the most obvious of the
serious difficulties we have to face. On the other hand, although
Conmunista has constituted to some degree a realistic internal danger,
it has above all come to symbolise those factors that have disturbed the
beneficent natural state of an American society which allegedly and in
phantasy existed before the urgent problems of control of the economy
and greatly enhanced responsibility in international affairs had to be
tackled.
1
Thus, blame is attached, but it is based, we must notice, on certain plausible
first premises. "Paranoid writing", states llofetadter, "begins with certain
broad defensible judgements."2 It is not merely coincidence that the ultra-
Rightist shares this propensity to start from seme real danger, and to ex-
trapolate from tills basis to wild conclusions, with the totalitarian actor.
Hannah Arendt writes,
The fiction of the Protocols (of the Elders of Zlon) was as adequate
as the fiction a Trotskyite conspiracy, for both contained an element
of plausibility—the nonpublic influence of the Jews in the pastj the
struggle for power between Trotsky and Stalin—which not even the
fictitious world of totalitarianism can safely do without.3
This Initial position of relative truth does not mean that the emergence of
e conspiratorial theory is based in fact, the contrary is the case. Both
KcCarthyism and totalitarian regimes have a tendency to provide a political
framework which is complete with a conspiratorial facet w'rdch is only based
on something lesB than a lialf-truth. Each, in its own way, represents a
journey into an ethereal world of innuendo and explicit accusation based en
largely fictitious evidence. "KcCarthyism", writes P.overe, "was, among
other things, but perhaps foremost among them, a
lParsons, loc . cit., p. 135.
2Kofstadter, loc . cit ., (Harpers), p. 86.
3Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism
.
(Cleveland! Meridian
Books, 1961), p. 362.
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head-long flight from reality."1 Arendt discerns a similar characteristic in
the totalitarian world. The masses, she says,
are predisposed to all idelolgies because the/ explain facts as mere
examples of laws and eliminate conincidcnces by inventing an all-
embracing omnipotence which is supposed to be at the root of every
accident. Totalitarian propaganda thrives on this escape from reality
into fiction, from coincidence into consistency.2
The "flight from reality", the evocation of a conspiracy, the tendency
toward paranoia, are combined in a syndrome which is observable not only in
America. The historical and international ties of such a political style are
particularly reminiscent of the symptoms of a malaise which gives rise to
totalitarianism, or of the actual existence of a totalitarian regime. Arendt
offers an insight which is of some relevance at this point.
The revolt of the masses against 'realisir.', common sense, and all 'the
plausibilities of the world' (Burke) was the result of their atomiaation,
of their loss of social status along with which they lost the whole
sector of communal relationships in whose framework common sense makes
sense.
3
The manifestation of paranoia is, then, effect rather than cause, but there are
indications that the personality attracted to ultra-Rightist movements may
have elements within him which contribute heavily to his inclination toward
accepting conspiratorial theories of government. The parallels which exist
between ultra-Rightist thought and that of the totalitarian governor give some
indication of the nature of the appeals of which we of democratic persuasion
must beware. History would disclaim any attempt to idly push aside the theory
of conspiracy in government—it has been used to too good an effect in the past
to be ignored.
'•Rovere, op_. cit., p. UO.
2Arendt, op_. cit
., p. liS2.
3lbid., p. 352.
III. Political ?oun(jations of Support
Political explanations of events are often tied very closely to other
social science disciplines, particularly those of sociology, economics and
psychology. At times it is somewhat difficult to disentangle the central
point or points in an explanation of political life. Frequently the foundation
of a "solution" to political problems does not lie in politics per se . The
McCsrthyist phenomenon is no exception, as we hope we have already shown. That
we are only at this stage dealing with McCarthy's political bases of support
does not mean that we judge this aspect of the foundations of his support as
less important than the other factors with which we have dealt. There are
identifiable political factors with which wo must deal. The concluding re-
marks at tho end of this chapter will attempt to draw the ingredients of
McCarthy's support into a coherent whole.
There has been some criticism of the hypothesis which explains McCarthy's
support in sociological terns. 1 Polsby points to what is for him a deficiency
in the study of KcCarthyism. "It is a surprising fact", he writes, "that
analyses have discounted so heavily the purely political aspect of his /McCarthy's/
SUCC9BS."
What factors in the political environment, therefore, allowed McCarthy
to arise as a national figure? Polsby identifies five particular points of de-
parture. First, the Republicans were searching for a means of embarrassing a
long-standing Democratic administration, and McCarthy happened to be a suitable
^See, Kelson Polsby, "Toward an Explanation of McCarthyism" , in Nelson
W. Polsby, Robert A. Dentler, Paul A. Smith (Ede.) Politics and Social Life ,
(Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1963), pp. 8l2-8liw
2Ibid, p. 815.
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method through which to achieve this end.* Second, since McCarthy had
congressional imnunity he could not be sued for libel or slander, and thus his
accusations could take on the wildest tones without being challenged in a
court of law.2 Third, McCarthy's exploitation of mass media,3 which we have
dealt with in Chapter II above. Fourth, the vulnerability of the Truman
administration on the question of the threat of internal communism," and,
fifth, "the emasculation of administrative resistance to McCarthy's activities,
by order of President Eisenhower. "5 (As far as this latter point is concerned,
the following chapter will deal with it exclusively.) We would add to Polsby's
list at least one more important basis for XcCarthyism, namely, the vacillation
which existed within Congress itself. Vie feel this to be of great significance
for us, for we believe that it is in this area particularly that the government
failed in its obligations to the American people. For this reason we will
devote a separate chapter to a study of Congressional action concerning McCarthy.
Danger may come from a distraught Republican party searching for an
issue with which to dislodge an entrenched Democratic administration. The party
may, possibly, turn to the right to do so, although tliis seems unlikely after
the Toldwater debacle of 196U.^ What we are concerned with fundamentally, is
^Ibid., p. 817.
2Ibid., p. 615.
3lbid
., p. 818.
4bid., p. 818.
%id., p. 818.
T"ure political reasons would seem to c viate this kind of attempt.
See, Philip E. Converse, Aage R. Clausen and Warren E. Miller, "Electoral Myth
and Reality: the 196L Election", American Political Science Review, Vol. LIX,
(June, 1965), pp. 321-336.
la
finding ways in which we can stop the disruptive nature of another Joe McCarthy.
Democratic processes will allow such demagogues to arise, thus, we believe,
the onus of dealing with them must fall on the legislature and the executive.
IV. Summary
We must repeat that there is no one source of KcCarthyiam, no single
piece of evidence to which we can point, exclaiming, "there is the reason". On
the contrary, McCarthy's sources of support were numerous and interlocking.
Sociological, psychological and political factors are bound together into a
conglomerate whole, seemingly with little coherence.
In a democratic society everyone is by no means imbued with tolerance
and ideas of fair-play. Social isolation and psychological authoritarianian,
bound together, form a powerful anti-democratic force. The parallel with the
masses who are appealed to by totalitarian movements, the declasseB of society,
is: not without sigr-icicitnee. Because people are politically inactive, we should
not simply ignore them. The apolitical person offers fertile ground for
extremist appeals in political life. 1 Theee a-political persons are more likely
to react to the conservative right than the liberal left,2 partly because the
extreme left in America has been emasculated by means of popular rejection and
governmental action.
The financip.l tieans of support for the ultra-Eight will continue to
exist as they do now,3 and such support, amoiigat other, will come from people
^rendt, op_. cit
. , p. 311.
2Ro6siter, op. cit., p. 182.
%or an idea of McCarthy's financial support, see Rovere, op. cit ., pp.
Iltl-lli3. For the financial basis of the radical Right see, Arnold For'ster and
Benjamin R. Epeicedn, Danger on the Right , (Hew Yorki Random House, 1961t),
pp. 272-280.
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who are chronically addicted to transmuting political questions into moral
questions. 1 Those who gave support to McCarthy are still active in American
political life j the ultra-Right is a seedbed for a McCarthy type political
actor.2
Since the executive branch of government was Involved in attempting to
deal with McCarthy in the early 19£0's, it is to it that we must now turnj
from its handling of the McCarthy affair, we may well be able to have a fuller
understanding of its mistakes and correct judgements.
^See Daniel Bell, "Interpretations of American Politics", in Bell (Ed.)
eg. cit., pp. 3-30.
2Forster & Epstein, op_. cit., p. 5.
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CHAPTER IV
Eisenhower and McCarthy
We have indicated that the political factors involved in this study
should be dealt with at some length. As far as we are concerned, this implies
that we must cast a searching look at the executive and legislative machinery
as it pertained to McCarthy and his position in American political life.
Every president of the United States has established, to greater or
lesser degree, a particular style by which one can identify his office.
Eisenhower was no exception to this rule. His concept of the presidency, and
the manner in which the office was operated by him, had a distinct relevance
to the machinations of Senator McCarthy. Combined with the Congressional
aspect of the McCarthy era, which will be dealt with in the two succeeding
chapters, the strategies of the executive branch of government were crucial
in setting the possible bounds within which McCarthy could work. If, by 1952,
McCarthy was, as we believe, a serious disruptive threat to the United States,
it would seem evident that some sector of the government machinery would have
to take him in hand. Eisenhower, as we shall attempt to show, was hampered by
his view of what were the permissible limits of presidential po«er, and also
by a belief that McCarthy had widescale support within the country.
We believe that Eisenhower, to some extent, negated the raison d'etre of
executive power. Executive power is "the power of government that is the most
spontaneously responsive to emergency conditions; conditions, that is, which
have not obtained enough of stability or recurrency to admit of their being
dealt with according to rule." 1 The reasons for this partial negation are what
^-Edward S. Corwin, The President , Office and Powers , 1787-1957 , (New
Torki New York University Press, 19bh), p.~3^
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we are here concerned with, and it is to them that we shall now turn.
I. Eisenhower - Political Background and Concept of the Presidency
1952 was, without doubt, a year of triumph for the Republican Party. Not
only had it succeeded in placing its candiate in the White House for the first
time in twenty years, but it also found itself with a majority in Congress.1
1952 was an important year for McCarthy too, for he was re-elected to the
Senate, largely on a campaign based upon virulent and demagogic appeals to the
threat of internal communism in America. McCarthy hid used the issue c Commu-
nism before 1952, in his 19lj6 campaign, " but the preparations for his re-election
in 1952 saw the burgeoning issue burst into flower.
3
More importantly, McCarthy, as a result of the Republican majority in
the Senate, became Chairman of both the Committee on Government Operations, and
its Permanent Sub-Committee on Investigations. If there had been hopes that a
republican victory would result in the toning down of McCarthy's frenetic
attacks on Communism, they were to be rudely disappointed. "Circumstances were,"
as Eric F. Goldman has written, "hardly such as to curb the arrogance of
1 Senate House of Representatives
Total 96 seats Total 1*35 seats
Republican 12 seats Republican 221 seats
Democrat kl seats Democrat 211 seats
Independent 1 seat Independent 1 seat
Vacancies 2 seats
Source: Congressional Digest , Vol. 32, (February, 1953), p. 3U.
2jack Anderson and Ronald W. May, McCarthy , the Kan , the Senator , the
"Ism", (Boston: Beacon Press, 1952), pp. 106-110.
^Rovere, c£. cit., pp. 120- 11*0.
Joseph McCarthy." 1 Clayton Knowles, as early as November of 1952, foresaw that
the accession to power of the Republicans would very likely produce an increase
in the number and intensity of investigations concerning security, rather than
a decrease, since the Republicans now had a chance to uncover Democratic
"mismanagement" in this area. 2 According to Eovere, Senator Taft, who was the
majority leader in the Senate, had hoped to isolate KcCarthy by assigning him
the committee posts mentioned above, but, as it transpired, he had made a grave
errorj McCarthy soon discovered that the Sub-Committee on Investigations could
deal with virtually anything it had a mind to.3 Congressional authorization for
the Committee on Government Operations was broad In scope. In part it read,
"Such committee shall have the duty of investigating and studying the operation
of Government activities at all levels with a view to determining its economy
and efficiency. »h In 1953, KcCarthy wasted little time in creating political
mayhem from the vantage points of his two chairmanships, with investigations
into the Voice of America, State Department Files and the Army Signal Corps
Radar Center at Fort Konmouth in New Jersey among others.
5
In all this political thrust and parry, it was not the size of McCarthy's
following that was crucial, in fact Polsby has argued that McCarthy did not
have wide-scale grass-roots support,• but, rather, the disruption of the normal
iEric F. Goldman, The Crucial Decade , (New Yorks Alfred A. Knopf, 1959),
p. 21*9.
2New York Times, Nov. 16th, 1952.
3Rovere, op_. cit., pp. 187-189.
llQuoted in "The Move for New Internal Security Laws", Congressional
Digest , Vol. JJOCIII, (May, 19510, p. 135.
^For a summary of these, and other investigations, see Congressional
Quarterly , Almanac , Vol. EC, pp. 331-350.
Polsby, loc. cit., pp. 818-82U.
functioning of government. 1 Perhaps even more important was the dilemma with
which Eisenhower was faced as leader of the Republican party. As far as the
party was concerned, McCarthy was certainly a dangerously divisive factor, since
he was a rallying point for many of the right wing Republicans within it. In
addition, as we shall observe in the next chapter, Eisenhower, in his role as
Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, did little to help the army when it
came under the heavy hand of the Wisconsin Senator. What were the principles
which invol od this inaction in President Eisenhower?
As Samuel Lubell has indicated, "How to handle McCarthy remained Eisen-
hower's most nettlesaae political problem during his first two years as
President."2 In the light of this, it is remarkable that Eisenhower tackled
the problem almost as if McCarthy did not even exist. The important clue to
the whole relationship lies in Eisenhower's concept of the office which he held.
On a spectrum between Teddy Roosevelt's view of the president as a "steward of
the people", and V/illiam Howard Taft'e view of him as only being allowed to
do that which was strictly stated in the Constitution, Eisenhower veered toward
the Taftian, or "passive" concept of the office.3 Lubell summarizes the central
attitude thus: 'the essential quality of his /Eisenhower's/ leadership has lain
in the skill with which he has followed the public mood. . .he led the people
by moving in the direction toward which they were already Inclined.» Eisen-
hower, then, tended to follow the line of Carlyle's aphorism, "I am their leader,
^ee, Rovere, oj>. cit., pp. 26-29. and Havens, op. cit. , pp. 6L-65-
2Lubell, oj>. cit., p. 29.
3Nelson Polsby, Congress and the Presidency , (Englewood Cliffsi
Prentice-Hall, 1961), p.~207
''Lubell, of>. cit ., p. 37.
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therefore I nust follow them". He clearly felt tliat what happened in Congress
was Congress' business, r>nd not directly Ids. 1 But, further tliau this, Eisen-
hower appears to !i3Ve been remarkably uninformed about McCarthy's actions. In
his autobiography, he states thet up to the time of his nomination, he knew
little of McCarthy and his operations because he had been abroad during 1951
and the first half of 1952. This would seem to indicate a curious lack of
information on Eisenhower's part, since by this time McCarthy had been on the
warpath for at least two years.
Eisenhower was convinced that McCarthy himself would be his o m undoing,
and that the best thing he himself could do was to ignore him. It is clear
that, while the president had a deep dislike of McCarthy himself , he did "not
intend to get into a public brawl with this nan. . .ay position as President of
this country, demands more dignity. I cannot brawl with every irresponsible
pers m who becomes a problem."'4 Some of Eisenhower's advisers were less
convinced of the President's sagacity in dealing with McCarthy. On November
2lith, 1953, McCartliy had appeared on television, stating that the internal
threat of coraaunism would be an issue in the 1951 Congressional campaign.
5
Eisenhower's staff were anxious to sonehow nullify this contention, but were
divided down the middle on whether Eisenhower should issue an outright
^Robert. J. Donovan, Eisenhower , the Inside Story, (New York: Harper and
Bros., 1956), pp. 21*3-2Ui.
2Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change (Garden City: Doubleday,
1963), pp. 316-317.
3Ibid
., p. 320.
''Quoted in Charl
p. 19.
'Donovan, op_. cit
., p. 2li6.
"Quot es E. Potter, Days of Sham)
,
(New Yorkj Coward-KcCann,
1965),
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denunciation or not.1 C. D. Jackson, the President's Chief Adviser on
Psychological Strategy, formulated a reply to McCarthy's television statenent
mentioning McCarthy by name, but Eisenhower rejected the draft of the note
saying, "I will not get into the gutter with that guy."2
The President was clearly repulead by McCarthy. The Wisconsin Senator's
antics during 1953 apparently aggravated tii intense feeling of disgust which
Eisenhower already had earlier in the year. In a letter to Harry Bullis of
General Kills written in May, and referring to the KcCarthyist offensive, the
President wrote, "It is a sorry mess, at times one feels almost like hanging
hie head in shame when he reads some of the unreasoned, vicious outbursts of
demagoguery that appear in out public prints." Eisenhower gave some idication
of the quandry in which he felt himself to be when he continued, "But whether a
Presidential 'crack down' would better, or would actually worsen, the situation,
is a moot question. "3
Donovan makes an interesting observation on Eisenhower's relations with
McCarthy in suggesting that the President was guided by an attitude rather than
a strategy in dealing with the problem—an attitude of disdain." It was, we
believe, largely for this reason that Eisenhower was at least once beaten to
the punch by the obstreperous Wisconsin Senator. The most notable occasion upon
which Eisenhower was, to all appearances, outwitted, concerned the Camp Kilmer
ilbld., p. 218.
Quoted in Ibid
., p. 2l»9.
3Dwight D. Eisenhower to Harry Bullis, Maj' 18th, 1953, Eisenhower
Papers , 0. F. 99-R, Eisenhower Library.
''Donovan, op_. cit., p. 257.
investigation carried out in February of 195k.1 The canp commander, General
Ralph Zwicker, was accused of harboring communists at his installation,
especially one Irving Perese who had been promoted from Captain to Major while
on duty there. McCarthy ordered John Adams, the Army's Council, to produce the
names of those who had been involved in this promotion within twenty-four hours.
In reply, Secretary of the Army, Robert T, Stevens, ordered Zvicker and others
not to appear before the subcommittee. In order for the bad relations between
Stevens and McCarthy to be patched up, a meeting was arranged between the
Republican members of the subcommittee and Stevens. At the meeting, held on
Wednesday, February 2lith, 195k» Stevens agreed to rescind his order that Amy
personnel should not appear before McCarthy's subcommittee if, for his part,
McCarthy would agree to treat them with the correct degree of courtesy. Stevens,
thinking he had achieved Ids objective, found, at the end of the meeting, that
McCarthy had invited the press to collect a memorandum after this ostensibly
secret encounter was over. The memorandum contained Stevens' concessions to
McCarthy, but none of the reciprocal concessions to which McCarthy had agreed
during the meeting.
While it is true that Eisenhower did not know of the McCarthy-Stevens
meeting prior to its occurrence, we believe that some degree of blame should be
attached to him. If, as Richard Neustadt has said, it is true that "he
Eisenhower could not quite absorb the notion that effective power had to be
extracted out of other men's self-interest; neither did he quite absorb the
notion that nobody else's interest could be wholly like his own,"2 then the
Stevens affair was not only Stevens' fault. Eisenhower had only very vaguely
lFor information concerning this affair, I have relied upon, Sherman
Adams, Firsthand Report
,
(New Yorkt Harper & Bros., 1961), pp. Ihh-lh6 and
Eisenhower, op_. cit
., pp. 323-325.
^Richard Heustadt, Presidential Power
,
(New lorki Signet Books, 1961i),
p. 156.
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talked of the treatment of officers of the executive branch by Congress, point-
ing out that fair play was in the American tradition and should be observed.
In fact, it was not until May 17th of 195k that Eisenhower made explicit, in a
letter to Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson, that the executive branch of
government, headed by the President could not be encroached upon by Congress;
this involved the making public of confidential material which was the business
of the executive branch alone. 1 Unlike President Truman, Eisenhower procrasti-
nated in his opposition to the Investigatory methods used by some Congressional
committees. Truman made it very clear at the outset of the loyalty-security
program set up in 191*6 and 19k7 that he would not tolerate executive information
concerned therewith being freely made available to Congressional committees. 2
There are other indications which bear out the argument that Eisenhower
was not entirely master of his own house. As the Eisenhower Administration was
constructed in 1953, there came to Washington one Donold B. Lowrie to be Under
Secretary of State for Administration.3 Lowrie was not a man with great
political experience, having previously been president of Quaker Oats. As part
of his duties, Lowrie made an appointment which frightened many knowledgeable
anti-McCarthyites. As Security Officer for the State Department he chose Scott
McLeod. KcLeod was an extremely conservative ex-F.B.I. man, and, to boot, a
stout defender of McCarthy. There was, then, grave danger that he might release
information to McCarthy, and, perhaps encourage the Wisconsin Senator to become
even more vituperative in his attacks on the executive branch. There were sub-
^Eisenhower, o£. cit.
, p. 597.
2Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol. II: Years of Trial and Hope , (Garden
Cityi Doubleday, 1956), pp. 278-28U.
3For a description of this incident I have largely relied upon Emmet
John Hughes, The Ordeal of Power , (New York! Atheneura, 1963), pp. &V86.
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sequently, indications that Scott McLeod was ready to make information
available to McCarthy,1 but the actual quantity which nay have been disclosed
appears to be a mystery. Rovers has even gone so far as to suggest that
HcLeod was "appointed by McCarthy" and, core or less, ran the State Department.'
1
Hughes' information would seem to discredit ttiia suggestion. Nevertheless,
what is ijnportant is that Eisenhower certainly put his control of the State
Department in jeopardy, something which be could ill afford to do ia the early
months of his Administration. A President' a power, as Newstadt points out,
resls partially in hie ability to choose. ". . .Adequate or not, a President's
own choices are the on3y means in his own hands of guarding his own prospects
for effective influence."^ Eisenhower, again, could scarcely have been fully
aware of this in appointing a man of Lowrie's political experience as Under-
Secretary of State for Administration.
There is another case, we believe, which offers a clear-cut example of
the way in which Eisenhower put his administration in jeopardy from a McCarthyist
attack. This concerned McCarthy's efforts in making deals with shipping
companies not to trade with communist nations. In the latter part of March, 1953,
McCarthy announced that he bad made agreements with some Greek shippers to the
effect that they had consented to refrain from trade with Communist countries."
On April 1st, Harold Stassen, Director of Mutual Security, in giving evidence
before McCarthy's Subtoranittee on Investigations, claimed that McCarthy was
InInvestigations Subcccoittee" in Congressional Quarterly Almanac ,
Vol. IX, (Washington D.C. > Congressional Quarterly l.'ews Features, 195h), pp.
337 and 338.
Tlovere, op_. cit., pp. 32-33.
3ueustadt, op_. cit., p. 62. (emphasis in original.)
kiew York Times , April 1st, 1953.
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undermining efforts to curb this type of trade in an enforceable manner, and,
thus, American foreign policy. 1 The same day, Secretary of State Dulles met
with McCarthy and pointed out to him that he (McCarthy) was in danger of
encroaching on the executives' sphere of power as laid down in the Constitution.2
The following day, April 2nd, there were some interesting developments. At a
press conference, President Eisenhower modified Stassen's insistence that United
States foreign policy had been "undermined", replacing this latter word with
"infringed" upon.3 it seemed as if Stassen had had his knuckles rapped by his
boss. Furthermore, that same day, McCarthy denied that he had been warned
about encroaching upon the executive branch's business by Dulles on April 1st.**
Both Arthur Krock and William S. White pointed out some of the dangers
which were implicit in the line the Administration had taken over this fracas.
Krock felt that while the Truman Administration had been wrong in openly
battling with McCarthy, the Eisenhower Administration was in danger of having
to face even worse consequences if it Bimply turned the other cheek. 5 White,
writing a few days later, wss more specific. Dulles had lost face in the eyes
of some Democrats. This endangered the bases of support for Eisenhower's
foreign policy in the face of a aplit Republican party. But the President had
not only offended the Democrats, said White, he had also caused some ill-felling
on the Republican side amongst those who wished him to make a clear stand
Ifrew York Times , April 2nd, 1953.
2Ibid.
3Kew York Times , April 3rd, 1953.
^Ibid
.
5lbid.
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against McCarthy.1 We do not, of course, have to accept these speculations in
toto , but they are important for at least two reasons. First, they give an
indication that Eisenhower was failing to use his influence to the maximum
degree, and further, that loss of prestige in one area (the Executive) may lead
to loss of influence in another area (Congiass). Second, they show that two
moderately conservative correspondents were by this stage asking, albeit
implicitly, for a stronger stance by the President vis-a-vis McCarthy.
It was perhaps possible that Elsenhower might have changed the whole
tenor of his relationship with McCarthy if he had not agreed, 3omewhat against
his own will, to refrain from criticizing the Senator while he himself was
campaigning in Wisconsin in 1952. 2 But, given that he did not, the President
had, it seems to us, set the pattern for his future attitude to McCarthy. It
is interesting to notice, however, that he was more concerned to criticize
McCarthy then, when he was not yet burdened with the Presidency, than he was
once he entered office.
Eisenhower, at least at the beginning of his Presidential career when
he had to face McCarthy, was by no stretch of the imagination an inveterate
politician. His approach to political problems in general was cautious, his
approach to the problem of McCarthy in particular was verging on one of non-
recognition, at least as far as the public knew. Hot without some justifica-
tion, James A. Wechsler summed up the situation thus: McCarthy
was not a superman; he was nourished more by the weakness of those who should
have resolutely challenged him—most notably Dwight D. Eisenhower—than
by any mysterious resources. There must have been many moments when he
shook with laughter over the conduct of those he was harrassing; surely
he must have enjoyed Kr. Eisenhower's austere refusal to indulge in
J
-New York Times , April 5th, 1953.
2This incident is related by Eisenhower, o£. cit., pp. 317-319.
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personalities: the craven formula devised early at the White House for
the preservation of internal Republican peace and quiet.
1
II. An Explanation of Eisenhower's Inaction
The President of the United States is burdened with many political roles
which he must fulfill. Inevitably, of course, these roles are by no means
smoothly interlocking; 2 role conflict was a feature of Eisenhower's Presidency
as much as it was of all twentieth century Presidents. Lester Seligman has
stated that "President Eisenhower's reluctance to 'take on' Senator McCarthy
was an attempt to minimize a conflict between his role as Chief Executive and
his role as party leader. "3 Eisenhower was anxious, as we have pointed out,
not to have a direct confrontation with McCarthy for fear that party unity
might be destroyed. He preferred, rather as he himself makes clear, to operate
in a more stealthy fashion behind the scenes. In early March of 195u, for
example, Eisenhower invited Senator Dirksen to breakfast.** The President
evidently hoped that he could encourage Dirksen, who was a Republican member
of the Subcommittee on Investigations chaired by McCarthy, to persut de the
Wisconsin senator to observe rules of fair play in his committee's hearings.
The apparent failure of this approach was borne out in the Army-McCarthy hear-
ings which started in the following month.'
Barnes A. Wechsler, Reflections of an Angry Kiddle-Aged Editor , (New York:
Random House, I960)
, pp. ntPTFT.
2Clinton Rossiter, The American Presidency, 2nd Edn: (New York: Mentor
Books, 1961»), pp. 38-39.
^Lester G. Seligman, "The Presidential Office and the President as Party
Leader" in Donald Bruce Johnson and Jack L. Walker (Eds.) The Dynamics of the
American Presidency
,
(New York: John Wiley, 1961i), p. 1B7.
TThis incident is related in Eisenhower, op_. cit.
, p. 325.
'See below, Chap. 5.
This tin—if of bow to deal with a uaverick in one's own part/ goes
soaeuhat deeper than simply the personality of Elsenhower himself. The problem
is one which is rooted fundamentally in the structure of American government
itself and, indeed, in the sheer size of the United States. Political partie*
in America, for instance, are highly docect-raliaed in nature, lack cohesion
and are relatively undisciplined.1 By drawing a parallel with the British
party system we nay indicate the kind of problem that Eisenhower faced in his
role as party leader. "The member of Parliament," writes Sir Ivor Jenninge,
is
. .
returned to support a party. lie recognizes his party obligations
by receipt of the 'whip' j if he disagrees with the party policy on a
particular matter, be may abstain from voting. Occasionally, perhaps,
he votes against his party. If he does so too frequently, he loses the
'whip'; and this means, probably, the loss of party support at the next
election. Without that support, he will probably not be elected.
2
Now, it is true that any President needs the help of Congress to put hie progiw
into operation. For this reason he hopes that he can acquire the backing of
his own party in Congress, but simply being party leader da 3 not guarantee
this j he must use the weapons of veto, patronage and so on, to eke out a work-
ing relationship with Congress, and with his party in Congress .3 Thus, the
threat of discipline is considerably less potent in the American party system
than in the British party aysten. It was certainly with some of this knowledge
in mind that Eisenhower took a stand of inaction toward McCarthy—lack of party
discipline made even him, as party leader, wary of taking action which might
upset the Republicans in Congress.
k
l£. E. Schattschnelder, Party Government, (Hew lorkj Reinhart, 19U2),
pp. 130-133.
2Sir Ivor Jennings, Cabinet Government , 3rd Ednj (Cambridge! Cambridge
University Press, 1959), pp. U72-U73.
^See, Corwin, oj>. cit ., pp. 263-291.
Eisenhower, c£. cit., p. 326.
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Intimately connected with the problerc of party leadership vis-a-vis
McCarthy, lo the question of the separation of powers In the national govern-
ment. We have pointed out that Eisenhower tended to regard this separation as
much more rigid than did a president of the type of Franklin Delano Roosevelt}
he thus left the condemnation of McCarthy to Congress. Of the implications of
this stance we shall have more to say in our concluding chapter.
If Eisenhower was deferential to Congress, he was more forceful in his
handling of the Executive branch, although here too there were inadequacies. It
is certainly true that the Executive is now so large that any real sense of
centralized control is lost. As Peter Woll has remarked, "Under the Constitution
the President is the executive, but this does not necessarily give him the
power to control tlie bureaucracy." 1 Eisenhower institutionalized the office of
the Presidency considerably, attempting to decentralize an overburdened chief
executive. 2 However, he was not the best of administrators in that I« "was not
especially interested in either the purposes or mechanics of most parts of the
federal administration, and the first requisite of a successful administrator
at the top of the pyramid is. . .an unforced interest in what goes on below. "3
Tliis would, perhaps, account for the appointment of a man like Scott HcLeod.
But, in connection with McCarthy, there was another apparent failure in
administration. Until McCarthy's attack on General Zwicker, according to Robert
Donovan, "by and large the White House had been taking a handsoff attitude toward
the dispute. . . .on the grounds that it was the Army's affair, and there was
Ipeter Well, American Bureaucracy, (New Yorki W.W. Norton, 1963), p. 11*3.
2corwin, op_. cit., pp. 300-305.
3Rossiter, cj>. cit., p. 160.
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little coordination between the White House and Stevens on it."
1 This would
sea. to indicate that Eisenhower's operation of the executive branch left
something to be desired in terra of location and coordination in dealing with
possible trouble spots. Inaction in this case arose on account of a rather
"oaqparhaentalizod" view of the executive '.ranch.
Eisenhower's attitudes toward McCarthy were of sane relevance too, for
they added a further reason for his inaction. The President felt that if he
ware to attack McCarthy openly, he would nerely give the Senator additional
publicity, thereby givlag bin exposure "without acideving any constructive
purpose."2 This, then, was a deliberate stand taken by Eisenhower; it was not
something which he nerely fell into.
IH. Surmary
There is no doubt that President Eisenhower played a large rule in the
McCarthy affair—this was inevitable since he was chief executive. Whether he
played a crucial role is not what we must assess here, but, rather, whether he
could have hastened the final collapse of Senator iicCarthy.
Eisenhower's view of his office was somewhat passive in relation to
Congress. Further than this, he seems to have taken a limited view of his role
as leader of the Republican party. These two facets of his political behavior
combined with at least two other factors to provide a somewhat amorphous machine
to deal with mavericks such as McCarthy. First, his lack of political acumen
in terms of the importance for him of maintaining the sources of his power.
Second, his own attitude c- aloofness to the whole question that Joseph McCarthy
^Donovan, op_. cit ., p. 2$1.
2Eisenhower, p£. clt., p. 320.
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poaed. The factor of the maintenance of power, poier that has to be earned by,
rather than simply bestowed upon, the President, is, we believe, of immense
importance. In his first /ear, at least, Eisenhower did not take full cognisance
of the situation thst, "The probabilities of poser do not derive from the
literary theory of the Constitution. m1
Even accounting for the fact of his personal dielike of McCarthy,
Eisenhower did not take enough precautions to protect hie own staff, the
treatment of vbich reflected, good or bad, upon him. These were thincs which
he could have controller. There were, and still are, other irore deep-rooted
politico-ctnxturol elements which could not be changed over night, and which
are unlikely to be changed in anything but the longest run. These would
include ouch ingredients of the American systeii of government as the separation
of powers, and, lees formally, an undisciplined party system, with its cen-
trifugal overcoming its centripetal tendencies.
There were, therefore, two identifiable types of problems which caused
delays and difficulties in dealing with McCarthy. The first type, which we shall
call immediate, was involved with Eisenhower's own decisions which could have
been changed at relatively short notice. The second type, which we shall call
extended, were problems which were not amenable to any real solution in the
lsnediate future, such as the American party structure and the separation of
powers. It is, partially, the intention of this study to attempt to see which
of these types and their subtypes are moot suitable for change in the American
political context.
lNeustadt, p£. clt., p. 51.
CHAPTER V
McCarthy and Congress
ffcCarthy's committee assignments in 1953 provided an important base of
power for him. If 1953 saw the emergence of a McCarthy with a real foundation
from which to launch himself, 195^ saw his sudden collapse. The very body which
had given him a base from which to work finally acted, condemning his actions
as a senator. In a sense, it is probably true that the very fact that the
Wisconsin Senator became chairman of both the Senate Committee on Jovernment
Operations and of its Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations was a very
mixed blessing. Initially, it seemed that such assignments might be used to
add impetus to Senator McCarthy's anti-Communist drive, and so they were. It
was ironical, therefore, that the Senator's antics on these committees finally
contributed to his downfall.
In this chapter our aim will be to cover four main areas in McCarthy-
Congressional relations, all of which occurred in WS^: the Army-'-fcCarthy
Hearings, from April 22nd to June 17th; the censure motion introduced by Senator
Ralph Flanders on July 30th, and its subsequent debate; the hearings and report
of Senator Arthur Catkins' Select Committee which reported on November 8th; and
the Senate debate on the .Vatkins Committee's recommendations, culminating in
the vote of condemnation on December 2nd. It is pertinent to our discussion,
therefore, to put these events into the context of the 83rd Congress, to answer,
first of all, some questions of personnel and personalities, alliances and
structure. The political environment in which McCarthy operated is of
importance if we are to understand his power and the Inherent inadequacies
in his position which led to his demise.
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I. McCarthy in the 83rd Congress , First Session
In the presidential election of 1952 Eisenhower had overcome Adlai
Stevenson not only by a large plurality of the popular vote, but also by an
overwhelming majority of the Electoral College votes oast. The Republican
majorities in Congress were much less startling, but there was, nevertheless.
Republican control of the national government apparatus. Eisenhower's victory
seems to have been more in the nature of a personal rather than of a partisan
political triumph.-^ As far as we are concerned, what is important is that the
Republicans came to control the Congressional committees through their majority.
The committees in Congress are, of course, of immense strategic importance,
and so too, a fortiori , are the committee chairmen. "It is difficult to
exaggerate," writes Daniel Berman, "the power of a committee chairman. Even
on committees with comparatively democratic procedures, chairmen are
generally able to exercise firm control, and what the committee does is seldom
different from what the chairman wants it to do."
Electoral College Popular Vote
Vote (in millions
)
Dwight D. Eisenhower "TO 33.8
Adlai E. Stevenson 89 27.3
Sources V.O. Key Jr., Politics . Parties and Pressure Groups , 5th Edn.s (New York:
Crowell, 1964). p. 173.
2See above, p. 1(3
.
3See Herbert H. flyman and Paul B. Sheatsley, "The Political Appeal of
President Eisenhower", Public Opinion Quarterly . Vol. XVII, (Winter, 1953-54),
pp. 442-460.
40aniel i4, Berman, In Congress Assembled , (New York: Macmillan, 1964).
p. 121.
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Senator :)oCarthy was assigned to two Senate Committees, Appropriations
and Government Operations, the latter of which he was chairman, and which was
to become the Congressional basis of his influence. He was not alone, however,
in his "crusade" against Communists in government. Senator rfilllam E. Jenner
of Indiana was appointed to three committees, Judiciary, Post Office and Civil
Service, and Rules and Administration, the last of which he became chairman.
Jenner was of the same inclination as ifcCarthy vis-a-vis the threat of Communist
subversion in America, lie carried out similar investigations to those of
McCarthy as Chairman of the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Ju-
diciary Committee.-'
..sabership of the Permanent Investigations
Subcommittee of the Senate Co.iralttse on Government Op orations ,
33rd Congress , 1st and 2nd Sessions
Age Occupation Veteran?
Party, 1 Seniority
Within It*
Joseph HeCarthy(Wisc) M Law
(chairman) Panning
Karl :lundt(3.Dak.) 53 Business, Teaching
3verett IArksen(Ill.) 57 La
Charles Potter(:'Aoh.
)
37 Civil Service
John ,cC lellan( Ark
.
)
57 Law
denry Jackson(.Vash. <H Law
Stuart Symington(i-io.) 9- Bus., Engineering
Vm
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Republican (18)
Republican (19)
Republican (25)
Republican (3D
Democrat (l4)
Democrat (38)
Democrat (W.)
Table I
Seniority in party based on "years served, orecedent, and opinions of key
officials", (Congressional Quarterly , Almanac . Vol. IX, 1953).
Sources: Congressional Quarterly, Almanac . Vol. IX, pp. 33^ «nd 30, and
Congressional Dirootory , 195J, pp. 133 and 61-62.
^Congressional Directory , 83rd Congress, 1st Session, (rfashingtoni U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1953). p. 2M
2Ibld
.. p. 239
3see Congressional Quarterly Almanac . Vol. IX, (Washington, D.C.i
Congressional Quarterly Hews Features, 195*0. pp. 317-32^.
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Senator McCarthy was not, the, alone in his tirades against CoramuniBm; he could,
in the Senate, rely on the support of Senator Jenner and, as we shall see at a
later stage in this chapter, of a number of other Senators.
The central pivot of McCarthy's base of attack was the Subcommittee on
Permanent Investigations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations. It
would seem that McCarthy deliberately chose the Subcommittee as the most useful
instrument for his particular purposes. First, the Subcommittee had the
advantage over its parent committee of being relatively small, numbering only
seven members in all. Second, McCarthy made sure of his control over it by
appointing himself its chairman. By doing so he avoided being raddled with a
subcommittee which might become an independent center of power, a not uncommon
occurrence with Congressional subcommittees. 1 Third the Subcommittee was very
flexible in its terms of reference, 2 thus allowing McCarthy to use it, more or
less, for ends which he, as Chairman, could determine. Thus even a cursory
glance at the publications of the Permanent Subcommittee in the 82nd Congress
yields a marked contrast to those of the 83rd Congress, after McCarthy had taken
over control as Chairman. In the 82nd Congress the Subcommittee was not concerned
with the threat of internal Communism - its major publications were concerned with
much more mundane affairs.3 In the 83rd Congress, the position had bo much
changed that the Subcommittee was dealing almost exclusively with matters
concerning Communism. ^ In addition, the Committee on Government Operations was not
^Berman, 0£. clt ., pp. 121*-125.
2See, U.S. Congress, Senate, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations,
Annual Report of the Committee on Government Operations , Report Ho. 881, 83rd
Congress, 2nd Session, 19514, PP. 3 and 8.
^See, U.S. Congress, Senate, Select List of Publications Issued by
Senate and House Committees
,
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Cffice,~l?6l). p. lOlu
klbid., p. 107.
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concerned with Communism either in the 82nd or 33rd Congress,! thus indicating
that McCarthy did not aim to use the larger organization as a vehicle for his
personal objectives. The 83rd Congress gave the Subcommittee augmented
financial muscle at McCarthy's request - $200,000 was appropriated for it in
1953, more than twice the appropriation for 1952. 2 In the second session of
the 83rd Congress, $211i,000 was appropriated for the Subcommittee. After some
probing by Senator Eastland, the money was voted on a roS.l-call which yielded
only one dissenting vote, that of Senator Fulbright of Arkansas .3 The type and
extent of the Subcommittee's investigations bear ample witness to the reasons
for asking sue], increases in funds. McCarthy used his political intuition
skillfully to provide the foundation for a rampage which lasted for a very full
eighteen months.
The Wisconsin Senator had first been elected to Congress in 191(6,"
assuring himself of victory by beating Robert LaFollette, Jr. in the Republican
primary. According to Anderson and May in their description of McCarthy's
campaign, it seems evident that he was by no meais totally scrupulous. Apart
from his campaign methods, he also chose to run for office while still a judge,
which was banned under the Wisconsin State Constitution. The Wisconsin State
Supreme Court decided, however, not to take disciplinary action.5 There was little
evidence in this campaign of the rabid anti-Communism that was to appear four
years later. How, then, did McCarthy come to be embroiled in such an issue in
llbid
., pp. 100-103 and lOlt-107.
Congressional Quarterly Almanac , Vol. IX, p. 33U.
3see, New York Times , February 3rd, 195b.
''For a description of this campaign see, Anderson and May, op_. clt .,
pp. 78-105.
$For a description of this facet of the campaign, see The McCarthy Record ,
(Madison: The Wisconsin Citizens' Committee on McCarthy's Record , 1951),
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1950? According to Rovere, the answer was pragmatic. "McCarthy took up the
Communist menace in 1950 not with any expectation that it would make him
sovereign of the assemblies, but with the simple hope that it would help him
hold his job in 1952." rfe have been able to find no evidence which would
prove this contention one way or the other. Rovere does provide some factual
2
material, however, which appears to back up his hypothesis, and it would
seem that the generally practical, hand to mouth, style of McCarthy's po-
litical action would reinforce Rovere's hypothesis. This, after all, is the
style of the demagogue.
The Subcommittee wasted no time in getting under way in 1953, and very
soon it was obvious what kind of investigations were going to be carried out.
On February ^th there began an investigation into mismanagement of State
Department files. 3 Very soon the hearings began to take on the face of un-
covering subversives in government. This investigation, as it transpired,
set the tone for the rest of the Subcommittee's investigations in that year.
There followed a number of perusals of various governmental agencies, including
the Voice of America, State Department Information Center Libraries overseas
and the Government Printing office.
iRovere, op_. cit.
,
p. 120
2Ibld.. pp. 122-123
3See U.S. Congress, Senate, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations,
State Department - File Survey , Report No. 836, 83rd Congress, 1st Session, 1953.
^For a summary of these, see Congressional Quarterly , Almanac , Vol. IX,
pp. 33^-351.
See, also, U.S. Congress, Senate, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations,
State Department Information Program - Information Centers . Report No. 879, 83rd
Congress, 2nd Session, 195^ •
,
Waste and Mismanagement in Voice of America Engineering Projects .
Report Ho. 880, 83rd Congress, 2nd Session, 195^.
,
Annual Report of the Committ ee on Government Operations , Report
No. 881, 83rd Congress, 2nd Session, 195^, pp. 15-18.
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There were, besides the investigations, a number of occurrences in 1953
which were to influence McCarthy's relations with the Senate in 195^. Perhaps
the most important of these events was the hiring of Roy Colin and David Schine
to the staff of the Subcommittee. McCarthy himself hired Cohn, and Cohn, in
turn, then hired Schine.
1
As we shall see at a later juncture, it was Schine'
s
induction into the Army, and Conn's reaction to it, that was in large part to
blame for hcCarthy's political collapse. Cohn and Schine were involved, too,
in an incident that caused some degree of hilarity in Europe, namely an
investigative tour of U.S. Information Service European libraries which started
on April *rth and finished on April 21st.
On July 9th, J. B. iiatthews. Executive Director of the Subcommittee
resigned following an article in the American fiercury in which he alleged that
the largest group supporting Communism in the United States was coapos9d of
Protestant clergymen. 2 Eisenhower was angry about the article, and had
brought pressure to bear on the Subcommittee to fire Matthews. 3 Sot all the
members of the Subcommittee had been in favor of Matthew's resignation, indeed
only one of the Republican members supported his ouster, Charles Potter of
Michigan. Potter was joined by the three Democratic members, Senators McClellan,
Symington and Jackson, in forcing the decision upon McCarthy. This was not,
however, the end of the affair. The next day, July 10th, the three Democrats
on the Subcommittee resigned. The reason for the resignations was simple:
Rovere, op_. cit., p. 191.
Congressional Quarterly . Almanac . Vol. IX, p. 3^.
3Adams, op_. cit., pp. M-l-1^2. See, also, Potter, op_. cit., pp. 117 and
173. Potter, it seems to us, exaggerates the role he played in forcing
Matthews' resignation.
^Congressional Quarterly , Almanac , Vol. IX, pp. 3^-3^1.
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McCarthy, they claimed, had complete and unwarranted jurisdiction over hiring
and firing procedures concerning Subcommittee staff. 1 In other words, the
it;embers of the Subcommittee were being allowed little or no influence in
a matter which could possibly be of great relevance to then personally.
On July 13th, the first genuinely overt signs of discontent with
McCarthy showed in the Senate. Senator Kike Konroney of Oklahoma charged
that the Wisconsin Senator had produced chaos in the State Department and was
endangering the work of the Central Intelligence Agency. "More and more,"
Konroney said, "the Senate and the Congress have Infringed upon the necessary
administrative prerogative granted to the President by the Constitution."^
The Oklahoman, however, was not content to leave his criticism there. He put
his arguments into an important overall context when he stated that,
Sooner or later - and I believe sooner - the Senate must be willing to
take full responsibility for acts of its committees and subcommittees,
and must be prepared to defend them as its own. Since the committees
act as an arm of the Senate, our people have the right to hold us personally
responsible for whatever is done in the name of the Senate and under
its authority. We cannot wash our hands of this ultimate responsibility.^
Konroney followed up his assault against McCarthy's Subcommittee a week later
on July 20th, when he introduced into the Senate Resolution II16. This reso-
lution would have put power in the Presiding Officer of the Senate to stop a
committee investigation if lie felt that the scope of the probe was outside
the jurisdiction of the committee. ^ But there the criticism ceased, for the
tisc being at least - Konroney at this stag* remained the exception to the rule.
1Ibid., p. 31*.
2U.S., Congressional Record , 83rd Congress, 1st Session, 1953, Vol. 99,
Part 7, p. 8619.
3jbid., p. 8620.
fclbid., p. 9185.
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On July 16th Senator ifcCarthy had written to the three Democrats who had
resigned from the Subcommittee, inviting them to return. Replying individually,
each turned down the offer.1 Politically, of course, this placed the onus on
the Republican members of tne Subcommittee - if there was blame to be attached
in the future, more of it was sure to rub off on these unfortunate G.O.P.
Members than on the Democrats, yy staying in the Subcommittee, the Republican
members maintained party unity, which, at the time, was perhaps the lesser of
two evils - refusing to serve under McCarthy or hoping that ay remaining on the
Subcommittee, they might be able to control ids most outrageous abuses of
Congressional power. As we shall see in the events of 195^, Senators Mundt
and Dirksen were far from being reticent in their support of their colleague
from Wisconsin; for them at least, the dilemma of whether to stay on the Sub-
committee or not, may not have appeared very real, rfhat is certain is that
those members who resigned were to be in a better position than those who
remained on the Subcommittee when the all out attack on McCarthy came in 195^ -
It would be difficult for him at that stage to defend himself by using an en-
tirely tu quoque method of defense. The three Democrats did rejoin the Sub-
committee on January 25th, 19&, but not until Senator rioCarthy had agreed to
certain changes in the rules of that body. First, hiring and firing of Sub-
committee staff members would henceforth only be done with approval of a
majority of the Subcommittee. Second the minority members would be able to have
tneir own counsel in the future. Third, a committee cleric would be made available
to them to keep them advised. Lastly, if the Democrat members of the Subcommittee
opposed public hearing on any question, that opposition would have to be
Congressional Quarterly, Almanac , Vol. IX, p. 3^1
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resolved by a vote of the parent Cesmittee on Government Operations.1 Thus, the
Denocrats had taken good care not to leave their flank open to possible
subsequent attack.
August 31st saw McCarthy's first contact with the Armyj on that day he
started to conduct one-man closed-door hearings into Communist infiltration of
the military services. 2 As 1953 drew to a close, so did McCarthy increase his
pressure upon the military. On October 12th the Subcommittee began hearings
into alleged espionage at the Army Signal Corps Radar Center at Fort Monmouth,
New Jersey.^ The hearings lasted until March of the following year. These
were f3teful steps for McCarthy to take, for it was the fight with the Array in
1951i which brought on the collapse of the mechanising of his influence.
Before turning to the Array-McCarthy hearings, it is worthwhile to look
back on the year 1953 through the eyes of the Annual Report of the Senate
Committee on Government Operations.'1 The report clearly bears the inprint of
Senator McCarthy. In 8 preface signed by him, McCarthy claisi3 that the Sub-
committee and its parent Committee on Government Operations were establislied in
part, to deal with subversion in government.? That this was cleerly not the
intention of the act which established the comaittee, as Monroney had pointed
out, was made clear on the following pages of the report in which the official
terms of reference for the parent-Connittee were laid out." This portion of
the Legislative Reorganisation Act of 1916 does not even approximate mention
^See New York Times , January 26th and 27th, 1951.
^Congressional Quarterly, Almanac, Vol. II, p. 3Ut.
^U.S. Congress, Senate, Permanent-Sub-committee on Investigations, Annual
Report on the Committee on Government Operations , Report Ho. 88, 83rd Congress,
2nd Session, 1951;, PP. l£E£T.W Ibid .
Sjbid., p. 1
6lbid., p. 3.
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of the word subversion in referring to the committee.
A later section of the Report brings up the problem of dealing with
witnesses, what their rights should be and so on.^ On page 8 of the Report
there is a reasonable interpretation of the powers of Congressional committees.
"A Congressional Committee can subpena witnesses, hear their testimony, and
make recommendations for legislation or take other appropriate action predicated
on the record of its hearings, but it has no direct punitive powers." The
last phrase is interesting in view of the contents of other parts of the Report.
By means of innuendo the Report would have us believe that those people who
plead the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution are, ipso facto
, Communists.
Pages ten through fourteen list all seventy-one witnesses who pleaded the Fifth
Amendment in public hearings before the Subcommittee. Inferentially, we believe
it is difficult to give credence to the general principles of Congressional
committees laid out at the beginning of the Report in view of the way in which
the seventy-one Fifth Amendment witnesses are later displayed in the same Report.
As we will see at a later juncture, the Army-McCarthy hearings will further
tend to bear out this scepticislm as to McCarthy's motives.
One last fact should be mentioned in dealing with this Report. Some
interesting figures are put forward concerning the number of witnesses questioned
and the number of investigations initiated by the Subcommittee. Of one thousand
seven hundred and forty-six witnesses, only two hundred and fifteen were
examined in public sessions, that is, before the whole Subcommittee. Three
hundred and thirty-one were examined in executive session, that is by McCarthy and
his staff. The remaining one thousand two hundred were interviewed by the sub-
committee staff. 3 What is clear from the information is that the majority of the
Subcommiti^reP§numOTateIf" alS °' P ' 8 * footnote ' in whloh the procedures of the
2See. Ibid
., p. 5.
3For these figures, see Ibid., p. 10.
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Subcommittee did not hear a majority of the witnesses involved in its
investigations during 1953. Much of this procedure came in for criticism
during the Array-McCarthy hearings. Since these latter hearings are important
in explaining Senator McCarthy's political fall, we must now devote a separate
section to them.
II. The Army-McCarthy Hearings
In 1954 Congressional elections witnessed the end, temporarily, of
Republican domination in Congress. .IcCarthy himself lost a major center of his
power when, with his fellow Republicans, he lost his Committee chairmanship,
and with it, his mastery of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigation. But
his power had already been eroded to a significant extent before the elections to
the 84th Congress, by a fight which was not undertaken entirely at the Senator's
own volition. The fight was, of course, with the 0, S. Army, which culminated
in Congressional hearings lasting from April 22nd to June 17th, 195^. to
consider charges and counter charges from the Army and ilcCarthy respectively.
At the heart of the problem which faced the Wisconsin Senator in the
Spring of that year was a twenty-five year old man who had been attached to his
staff for the preceding twelve-months—G. David Schine. Schine had been
brought onto the permanent Subcommittees staff on the recommendation of Roy Conn,
the Chief Counsel of the Subcommittee. Schine acted as unpaid chief consultant
to the Subcommittee from February of 1953 until the time of his induction into
the Army on November 3rd, 1953. What were to become known as the Array-McCarthy
hearings centered around the circumstances of Schine' s being drafted into the
^•U. S. Congress, Senate, Special Subcommittee on Investigation, Charges
and Countercharges Involving Secretary of the Army Robert T. Stevens , John G.
Adams
. U. Struve Jens el and S enator Joe ilcCarthy , Roy M. Conn , and Francis.^ .
Jarr
.
Report Ho. 2507, 83rd Congress, 2nd Session, 195^. p. ^."THereafter
referred to as Subcommittee, Report
.
)
70
armed forces. Rumors had been circulating in the early part of 195^
concerning Roy Conn's allegedly dubious actions on behalf of his fellow staff
member in connection with Schine' s induction. 1 In order to clarify the situ-
ation, a Chronological Series of Events was published on March 10, 195^ by the
Departments of Defense and the Army. 2 It was circulated to a number of Senators
and Representatives 3 with repercussions that were to set off a stream of
events that have been called "the greatest political show on earth. 1*
On April 13th the Army made charges against McCarthy and some of his
staff in relation to the person of David Schine. "The Department of the Army",
the document began, "alleges that Senator Joseph R. McCarthy as Chairman of the
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, ....United States Senate, and its
Chief Counsel Roy A. Cohn, as well as other members of its staff, sought by
improper means to obtain preferential treatment for one Private G. David Schine,
U. S. Army, formerly Chief Consultant of their Subcommittee... "5 This general
charge was then followed by particulars as to when, where and how such "improper
mean;" had been applied. One week later, on April 20th, McCarthy struck back,
rejecting the charges that had been preferred against him as 'unfounded." In
addition, the Senator preferred counter-charges against Robert T. Stevens,
Secretary of the Department of the Army, and John G. Adam3, Counselor of the
Department of the Army, while also making charges concerning malfeasance of
1Ibid., p. 1.
2See Appendix I in ibid ., pp. 103-110.
3lbid.. p. 1.
4David T. 3azelon, in the Introduction to de Antonio and Talbot,
op . cit.
, p. 11.
Subcommittee, Report
, p. J.
6see ibid., pp. 3-5.
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office against K. Struve Hensal, Assistant Secretary of Defense. Stevens
and Adams were accused, in essence, of using the Schine case in order to force
the Permanent Subcommittee to cease its investigations into subversion in the
armed services.-'' Charges and countercharges having been mads, the Senate,
according to then Republican majority leader William F. Knowland, should have
moved to Investigate them with all speed. The task of conducting hearings on
the charges fell to McCarthy's Subcommittee, from which he himself temporarily
abdicated his position; Senator Karl Mundt of South Dakota consequently took
the chair and Senator Henry Eworshak of Idaho was co-opted onto the Subcommittee
to bring it up to full strength again.
i.'e shall not be concerned, by and large, merely with the procession of
events in the hearings. As we have stressed in Chapter One. what we are
interested In doing is assigning historical significances to situations in
order that we may use them to learn for the future. Thus, we must ask our-
selves, what was in the Array-.^IcCarthy hearings that is relevant to this problem
of foresight in politiasT Clearly, some of the information which was turned up
in the hearings themselves is important, but perhaps Just as significant for
us were the attitudes of the members of the Subcommittee in the Reports that
they submitted upon termination of the hearings. Wa shall, therefore, be
selective in our approach to the televised political extravaganza known as the
Army-McCarthy hearings.
The aura of the hearings was something to which the public had not
hitherto been submitted. Television was used to cover the hearings which was
at once a boon and, eventually, a source of discomfort to McCarthy, He himself
*For the complete list of McCarthy's charges against Stevens, Adans, and
Hansel, see ibid ., pp. 5-H.
2Potter, op_. cit.
, p. 133.
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was In a somewhat peculiar situation. David Sohine had Haver seemed an
important part of his life, not, at least, in the same way as Roy Conn
evidently was. As it transpired, we believe, McCarthy became a drowning man
politically because of his defense of a person in whom he really had no interest.
In other words, McCarthy was put in an unenviable position as a result of an
appointment for which he had not been directly responsible. Several events
will, we think, bear out the Wisconsin Senator's predicament. In a phone call
which he made to Secretary of the Department of the Army Stevens on November 7th,
1953, itcCarthy said in part,
I would like to ask you one personal favor. For God's sake, don't put Dave
(Schine) in Service and assign him back to my committee. From three
standpoints: One, I couldn't get away with any more than a week. The
newspapers would be back on us, and you would have to send him back into
uniform anyway, Two: this thing has been running along so cleanly so far,
they have not been able to beat your brains out And the third thing, they
would say I asked for him. He is a good boy, but there is nothing indispensable
about him.l
McCarthy went on to point out that Roy Conn was very unreasonable in asserting
that Schine should not be treated like any other draftee, in that he wanted
Schine assigned back to work on the Subcommittee instead of earring out his
basic training. The Senator added that Conn had been on the verge of leaving
his job as Subcommittee counsel when he thought that McCarthy might be willing
to let Schine carry out his Army commitment like any other draftee. The phone
call was followed up by a letter to Secretary Stevens dated December 22nd, 1953.2
The communication read in part, "I have an unbreakable rule that neither I nor
anyone in my behalf shall ever attempt to interfere with or influence the Army
in its assignments, promotion, et-cetera." Somewhat later in the letter.
See Subcommittee, Report , pp. 116-117 for text of whole'phone call.
2For the text of the whole letter, see ibid
., p. 118.
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McCarthy wrote, "while I am Inclined to agree that »r. Sehine would never
have been drafted except because of the fact, that he worked for my committee,
I want to make it clear at this time that no one has any authority to request
any consideration for Mr. Sehine other than what other draftees get."
It is clear from the hearings that Cohn was the person who was pressuring
the Army, 1 and that McCarthy, wishing, for reasons of his own, to retain Cohn
on his Subcommittee staff, became embroiled in attempting to defend his Chief
Counsel's position. The majority findings at the end of the hearings were more
critical of Roy Cohn than they were of Joe McCarthy. The latter was criticized
mostly for his inability to control his own staff, while the former was found
to have exercised undue exertion on behalf of his comrade, Private G. David
Sehine.2 The minority findings, similarly, made it patently obvious that they
found an equally important distinction between what was done on behalf of Sehine
by Cohn, and what was done on his behalf by Senator :-*:Carthy. Cohn, according
to the minority, took the actions concerning Sehine, but IcCarthy was culpable
because he had condoned these actions.-' Senator Charles E. Potter, adding a
personal opinion in addition to the majority findings and recommendations which
he had signed, supported the minority's opinion strongly in stating that, "The
fact that Senator McCarthy at no tine expressed disapproval of Mr, Cohn's
actions in his efforts to obtain favors for Mr. Sehine, gave the strength of
sanction to them."*
ISee, for instance, ibid ., pp. 32 and 35-36.
2lbid
.. pp. 79-80.
3lbid., pp. 87-88.
^Ibid
.. p. 100.
7l»
Roy Cohn could not have contrived to get away with as much as he did,
were it not for an environment which was favorable to this particular type of
arcanum, iiore than any other person with whom either Cohn or McCarthy had
dealings. Secretary Stevens appeared to be the least forceful, the least-decisive
and the least politically intelligent. 1 The findings of the Subcommittee
relating to Stevens are as critical of him as they were of either Cohn or
I oCarthy. The majority report says in reference to the Secretary of the
Department of the Army,
We find that the motives of Secretary Stevens, as head of the Army, were
beyond reproach, but that he followed a course of placatlon, appeasement,
and vacillation throughout the period leading up to this controversy when
he should have asserted himself by protesting such action promptly to the
committee or by terminating such contacts through administrative action.
2
The minority report went even further In stating that privileges were accorded
to Schlne where they should not have been. Responsibility for this happening,
the minority report alleged, lay at the feet of Stevens and Adams. Senator
Potter, In addition, in his separate statement, concluded that Stevens "showed
a lack of competency in this matter i.e. handling the Schlne affair which at
times suggested bewilderment. He did not grasp the far-reaching and deleterious
effects of such indecision on Army personnel. "3 Stevens, then, according to
these sources, acted with a lack of decision, finally finding himself in a very
unenviable position vis-a-vis McCarthy and his staff members, moreover, as we
have mentioned above,'* Eisenhower was not always forthcoming with the kind of
support for Stevens which The Secretary of The Army needed to repulse Conn's
advances on behalf of Schina.
5
^See Michael Straight, Trial by Television
.
(Boston: Beacon Press,
195"*). Chapter ^.
Subcommittee, Report
, pp. 80-81.
3lbld
. . p. 101.
''See, Supra Chapter 4.
5See, Senator Potter's comments In Potter, op_. clt.
, pp. 182-183.
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There would seem to be some good reason for maintaining that, "It vas
Cohn who brought Schlne to his castle on Capitol Hill. It was Sohine who brought
the eastle down by adding one too many blocks on top of the dizzy structure
Cohn had built. "^ It is, therefore, important to point out that McCarthy
suffered from his attachment to Cohn and his consequent laxness in allowing
Cohn his head with the Executive Branch. The personality reasons of McCarthy
himself here are not under investigation; as far as we are concerned, we merely
wish to point out that Cohn, somehow, «a.i necessary to HcCarthy. If this is so,
the Army-McCarthy hearings, which certainly demonstrated lieCarthyist techniques
to the nation and from which McCarthy suffered accordingly, resulted from a
political failure on the part of the Senator. Like President Eisenhower,
/loCarthy had failed to ensure his power position by indirectly making an
appointment which contributed to the undermining of his popular appeal.
The Army-uicCarthy hearings mark the real turning point in the Wisconsin
Senator's career. It is one of the paradoxes of this political show that one
of the crucial points in it was one in which KeCarthy finally ended up by tying
a noose around his own neck, while Roy Cohn, the real progenitor of the hearings,
looked on in dismay, attempting to stop what he evidently regarded as a very
dangerous move. The Incident to which we refer is one in which McCarthy, quite
out of context, proceeded to assail Joseph H. ,/elch. Counsel for the Army, for
harboring a Communist sympathizer amongst the members of the law firm of which
he was a partner. Welch, replying to I'KsCarthy, said in part, "until this
moment. Senator, I think I never really gauged your cruelty or recklessness."
Welch then went on to point our that Fred Fisher, the young man in question, had
been a member of a Communist front organization for a short space of time, and
was now a Young Republican and a man with Integrity well aware of the mistake
of the past. In closing his defense of Fisher, Welch said, "I fear he /Fisher?
Straight, op_. cit., p. 189
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ahall always bear a scar needlessly inflicted by you. If it were in my power
to forgive you for your reckless cruelty, I would do so. I like to think I'm a
gentleman, but your forgiveness will have to come from someone other than me."
1
McCarthy would not let the matter lie at this point — almost impulsively he
continued to belabor Fisher and his past associations. Finally, Welch would
hear no more. "Mr. McCarthy," he said,
I will not discuss this further with you. 1'ou have sat within six feet
of me and could ask, could have asked me to bring it out and 1" there is
a God in heaven, it will do neither you nor your cause any good. I will
not discuss it further. I will not ask Mr. Cohn any more witnesses.
Tou, Mr. Chairman, may, it you will, call the next witness.
2
McCarthy admitted at one point that he knew that Roy Cohn did not want him to
pursue the matter further, but, irrespective, he carried on. "Roy Ct n vainly
signaled the Senator to stop the attack. But it was too late — the country
had seen McCarthyism at work, and it would not forget."3 One survey, however,
does not bear out some observations that the Army-McCarthy hearings changed
the minds of many people. A study carried out in two "middle-sized cities" in
Maine and Kansas, in 195U, contained, amongst others, the following conclusion:
"The hearings had relatively little effect in changing respondents' minds about
Senator McCarthy." 1' Whether or not attitudes to McCarthy were changed by the
hearings, the fact remains that his political decline dates from this time,
although we should add that the 195k Congressional elections deprived him of
his valuable chairmanships in Congress. It may be that the events of the
ipor this incident, see deAntonio and Talbot , op. cit., pp. 90-97.
2Ibid., pp. 96-97.
^Norman Dorsen and John G. Simon, "McCarthy and the Army-A Fight on the
Wrong Front," Columbia University Forum , Vol. VII, (Fall, 1965), p. 28.
Ki.D. V.'iebe "The Army-McCarthy Hearings and the Public Conscience,"
Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. XXII, (Winter, 1958-59), p. 502.
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Army-McCarthy hearings, the censure debate, with which we shall deal next, and
the Congressional elections are too intertwined to ascribe the Senator's fall
to any one of these incidents. A combination of events, triggered his
political collapse; what we are more concerned with is why his demise did not
come sooner.
Dorsen and Sinon have argued tliat there were at least two reasons why
the Army did not fight back against KcCarthy earlier than it did — it had
certainly been provoked sufficiently to do so. First, Republican officials
did not want to appear "soft on Communism 1' and perhaps risk splitting the
Republican Party. Second, the Administration officials could not empathize with
the kind of people who were being harrassed — privates in the Army and members
of minority groups at work as civilians in Fort Monmouth. The real battle,
Dorsen and Simon claim, should not have been joined over the treatment of
David Schine, but should have been fought, rather, over the more fundamental
question of Congressional rights in regard to investigation of the Executive.
'
This contention will be pursued further in our concluding chapter.
The Army-KcCartliy hearings were at the same time demonstrations of
KcCarthy at his zenith and at his nadir. Publicity undoubtedly contributed
to many people's growing antipathy toward liim — television was both blessing
and bane to the Senator. The question which we may well ask is whether the
hearings need have taken place at all? This is not a sterile issue. On
balance, demagogues have a desire for publicity. It is our contention, which
we hope to substantiate in the following chapter, that both Congress and the
Executive could have found other, better, methods for dealing with McCarthy
that would have severely reduced his political drawing power. If they
^See Dorsen and Simon, loc . cit., p. 2k.
2Ibid., pp. 2ii-25 and p. 28.
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achieved nothing else, the Army-McCarthy hearings finally precipitated a
full-scale debate on whether the Senator from Wisconsin was deserving of
censure by his colleagues.
III. The Censure Debate .
It was a Republican, Senator Flanders of Vermont, who initiated the
action which was to lead to McCarthy's condemnation by the Senate. On July 30th,
195lt he introduced to the Senate Resolution 301, which read, "Resolved: That
the conduct of the Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. McCarthy) is unbecoming a
Member of the United States Senate, is contrary to Senatorial tradition, and
tends to bring the Senate into disrepute, and such conduct is hereby condemned."!
Following the introduction of the resolution, two Senators on the Republican
side of the aisle made clear their intention to vote against any such resolution
of censure, Everett Dirksen of Illinois and the Senate majority leader, William
Knowland of California. 2 Dirksen made it plain that he felt that the Senate
would merely be helping the Communists by voting for the Flanders resolution.
"Take your choice, Senators," said Dirksen.
Do your want to march with that multitude to do evil and liquidate a
member of this body by the name of McCarthy, or are we going to stand up
and be counted for a man—whom I do not defend on every score, by any means,
a man whom I have scolded roundly many times, but a man who has had the
courage to go forward and do a good job, as he saw it, for his country,
notwithstanding the mistakes he made.
3
Objections to the resolution were not based only on this type of grounds.
Senator Wayne Morse voiced misgivings in connection with the resolution,
although he evidently did not oppose the spirit of it. The Oregon Senator was
more concerned with the fact that the resolution was too broadly worded.
ln.s. Congressional Record , 83rd Congress, 2nd Session, 195U, Vol. 100,
Part 10. p.~12729. Hereafter cited as, Congressional Record , Vol. 100, Part. 10.
2See Ibid
., pp. 12736-1271*2.
3Ibid., p. 127li2.
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Morse preferred that specific charges be made rather than more general
assertions. 1
Debate on the resolution was initially perfunctory and it was finally
decided on August 2nd that the question should be referred to a select committee
of three Republicans and three Democrats chosen by the Vice-President. 2 This
decision had been suggested by Senator Corden of Oregon on July 30th.3 The
Select Committee as established was composed of Senators Watkins of Utah,
Johnson of Colorado, Stennis of Mississippi, Carlson of Kansas, Case of South
Dakota and Ervin of I.'crth Carolina, with Senator Watkins acting as Chairman
and Senator Johnson acting as Vice Chairman.'1 The committee was not bound to
studying alleged misconduct since 1952 only} the investigation was more wide-
spread, covering McCarthy's career in the Senate since his election in 191*6.
The Committee did in fact look back to one particular incident prior to 1953,
that of the fracas that had emerged between Senators Benton and McCarthy.'
More recent allegations of misconduct were also investigated by the Committee
involving encouragement of executive officers to violate laws and oaths of
office, abuse of fellow Senators, receipt of classified material and the
incident relating to Oeneral Ralph Zwicker.^ We are not here concerned with
ilbid., pp. 12735-12736.
2u.s. Congress, Senate, Select Committee to study Censure charges, Report,
Report Ho. 2508, 83rd Congress, 2nd Session, 195lt, p. 1. Hereafter cited as
Select Committee, Report .
3select Committee, Report
, p. 2.
^Congressional Record , Vol. 100, Pt. 10, p. 12732.
^For a full exposition of these occurrences, see ibid ., pp. 5-31 and U.S.
Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections, Investigations of
Senators Joseph R. McCarthy and William Benton , Report No. 1j59, 82nd Congress,
2nd Session, 195?.
^See, Select Committee, Report
, pp. 31-61.
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the Intricacies of the Committee Report, but rather wltn the end results of
its deliberations. 1 In connection with alleged abuse of the Subcommittee on
Privileges and iileotions, in reference to the Wisconsin's altercation with
Senator Benton, the Select Committee found grounds for censure. Similarly,
the Select-Connittee found that McCarthy, in its opinion, should be censured
for his behavior in the case of his treatment of General iwicker. In all
the remaining cases dealt with by the Committee it was felt that a resolution
of censure could not be justified.
Ihe Select Committee reporter! its findings on November 3th, 1954. The
Senate lost little time in initiating discussion on the basis of these findings
and Senator inlander's resolution of censure, Lebats began on November 10th,
and continued, with one significant break, until December 2nd, 1954.2 There
are several factors in the debate which are of relevance as far as we are
concerned. With one or two notable exceptions, certain Republican Senators
provided their party confrere with his most effective defense and with some of
his most trying moments. It will be remembered that Senator Flanders, a
Republican, had introduced the censure motion. Although the Senator from
Veraont did not participate to any large decree in the debate, his presence
was constantly there in spirit, if not in t:ie flesh. Senator Watkins, of Utah,
it will be recalled, had been appointed chairman of the Select Committee,
lie too was a Republican, and one of the few men not to be intiaidatod by
McCarthy's attacks. In defending his Committee's actions in the Senate, he
did not flinch in his adherence to the Committee's procedures or findings. 3
3-For the Committee's recoijaendations, see ibid ., pp. 67.68.
2See, Congressional Record
.
Vol. 100, Part 10, pp. 15922-16395.
3see, for instance, ioCarthy's verbal assault upon Watkins in ibid.,
pp. 15922.15934.
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Republican defense of McCarthy was more prolific. Senator Welker of
Idaho was the most consistent defender of the Wisconsin Senator's interests,
but he was backed in his efforts by a number of party comrades. Everett
Dirksen
oontinued to defend McCarthy, finally offering an amendment to Senate Resolution
301, on December 1st.
1 The amendment would have effectually repudiated the
charges against Senator hcCarthy but it was voted down 66-21.
2 Help, too,
came from Senator Jenner of Indiana, a long time stalwart of McCarthy's
battles
involving Communist subversion, and Chairman of the Sonate Subcommittee
on
Internal Security. Senator Barry Ooldwater also gave his support
to the
beleaguered Senator, and was joined by Senator Mundt of South DekotO But
of all these, it was Senator Welker who bore the brunt of the
defense.
The Democrats, for the most part appeared to be content to leave
the
Republicans to argue amongst themselves. An exception existed in Senator
Fulbrlght of Arkansas, who had been an opponent of McCarthy's for a
long
period of time prior to the censure debate. By inference. Fulbrlght
gave
indications of some of the riff-raff which he considered NoCarthy had
wittingly,
or unwittingly, attracted to his support, when on November 30th, he
read into
the Congressional Record various letters which he had recently
received.
A propos this correspondence he remarked that criticism
had changed from
"legitimate differences of opinion" to "unadulterated hate, vituperation.
and abuse." He went on. "It is highly emotional, irrational,
and designed
to intimidate and overawe Members of the Senate.''* The Senator
from Arkansas
was joined in his attack upon rtoCarthy by Senator Lehman of New York. but.
kbld.
.
p. 16322.
2Ibld .. p. 16329.
3see. for instanoe. ibid ., p. 16001 and p. 16330 respectively.
*»Ibld.
.
pp. I6l9b-16200.
5lbld. . p. 16196.
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as we have pointed out, the Democrats tended to avoid what seemed to be in
essence an intra party affair.
Numbers of amendments to the original Flanders resolution were
proposed1 until at long last, on December 2nd, 1951* a vote was taken on Senate
Resolution 301 as amended. 2 The resolution now consisted of two sections.
The first of these condemned McCarthy for his behavior in connection with the
Senate Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections which grew out of his dispute
with Senator Benton in 1951 and 1952. The second section condemned him for
charges he had made against the Select Committee set up to investigate grounds
for censure in relation to the original Flanders resolution. The words of the
resolution did not mention censure specifically. There was some short discussion
as to this point subsequent to the vote on Senate resolution 301. Some senators
were dubious as to whether the Resolution was one of censure or not, but the
final decision was probably best manifested in the following exchange:
Mr. Bridges « Mr. President, another parliamentary inquiry.
The Vice-President: The Senator will state it.
Mr. Bridges: Then the resolution which has been agreed to is
not a censure resolution?
The Vice-President: The Senator has not stated a parliamentary inquiry.
Mr. Bridges: The Senator from New Hampshire will ask the Chair
if, after the elimination of the word "censure"
in the amendment of the title, the resolution as
adopted concerns the censure of a United States
Senator.
^These amendments, and individual Senators' votes upon them, are
usefully summarized in Congressional Quarterly, Almanac , Vol. X, pp. U72-U73.
2For the full text, see Congressional Record , Vol. 100, Part 10,
p. 16392.
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The Vice-Presidents The Senator has stated the same inquiry in different
words. The resolution does concern the conduct of a
Senator, and the Senator free New Hampshire or other
Senators may place upon the resolution such
interpretation as they desire. •*
Senator McCarthy was equally reticent when, immediately after the vote, he was
asked whether he felt he had been censured. "Well," he replied, "it wasn't
exactly a vote of confidence." 2 What was clear was that the precedents for the
Flanders resolution had not mentioned censure either, but the Senators
involved had been considered, nevertheless, censured.
3
During the debate on Senate Resolution 301, demonstrations for McCarthy
were displayed, the chief one being on November 30th at Kadison Square Garden
in New York City. The organizers had hoped for at least 20,000 participants in
the rally, « but, as it transpired, only approximately 13,000 persons did turn
out.5 The reporter covering the story for the New York Times recorded that the
chief villains of the meeting were, Senator Flanders, Franklin Roosevelt,
Harry Truman, George C. Marshall, Dean Acheson and the New York Times . The
personalities who evoked the most rousing reaction from the crowd were, he
added, General hcArthur, Senator HcCarran, Roy Cohn, Senator Bricker, Westbrook
Fegler and Senator Knowland." The debate on the Flanders resolution was not
merely a matter which concerned the Senate alone. Senator Watkins, whatever
his pergonal feelings concerning the Senator from Wisconsin, aptly summed up
the wider implications of McCarthy's actions. At the conclusion of a long
llbid., pp. 16392-16393.
2
,'iew York Times , December 3rd, 195ii.
3Ibid
.
*
*New York Times , November 29th, 195lw
^New York Times , November 30th, 1951.
^bid.
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speech delivered in the Senate on November 16th Senator Watkins had this to say:
...when a Senator takes the oath of office to defend and to support the
Constitution of the United States, that pledge is not merely reference to
a document containing certain words. It goes to the living Constitution.
That living Constitution consists not only of words, but the Office of the
President, the Supreme Court, the Senate, and the House of Representatives
which those words create. When a Senator does or says things which injure
those institutions, he is violating the living Constitution of the United
States.
1
Senator Lehman of New Y5rK, too, made some pertinent comments on the broader
scope of McCarthy's behavior. On November 30th he said in the Senate,
It is not Senator McCarthy the individual who is at issue. There is no
individual Member of the Senate who would merit, or who could justify, the
expenditure of the time and energy we have devoted to this question. No,
the junior Senator from Wisconsin is only the symbol of the real issue. The
real issue is the nature of the Senate, and its ability to insure that the
powers conferred upon each Senator under the rules and under the Constitution
powers provided for the protection of tue people - shall not be used to
abuse people, to distort the legislative process, and togbesmirch the name
and dignity, not only of the Senate, but of our country.
The remarks of Senators Watkins and Lehman were lent some credence,
if in a way which they had not quite intended, by the action of the Senate in
connection with Senator McCarthy. As one would expect from an inspection of
the debate on Resolution 301, the final vote clearly showed that McCarthy
divided tha Republican party much more than he did the Democratic party. The
Democrats, apart from Senators Gore, Kennedy and Smathers, who did not vote,
registered their approval of the resolution as amended. 3 The Republicans, on
the contrary, could not show such a united front; they were, in point of fact,
split down the middle, twenty-three of them voting for the motion, and twenty-
two against it. Republican Senators Bricker, Capehart, and Wiley did not vote,
while Senator IdoCarthy answered "present" when his name was called on the roll.
^
-Congressional Record
.
Vol. 100, Part 10, p. 16061.
2Ibid
. . p. 16220.
3?or this, and the following voting data on Senate Resolution 301, see
Ibid
., p. 16392 and Congressional Quarterly, Almanac . Vol. X, p. ^73.
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Perhaps the most Important single vote on the Resolution was that cast against
it by Senate majority leader William f. Knowland. Although Knowland would no
longer be in the position of majority leader in the 8ijth Congress, he was still
in a position of considerable power. William S. White remarked that Knowland's
vote against the Resolution would widen the split in the Republican party and
would deprive Eisenhower of any effective leadership in the Senate,
1 since it
was well known that Elsenhower supported the Resolution, having personally
congratulated Senator Watkins on December hth for the job which he had done.2
White's comment may appear somewhat too strong, but it is certain that relations
between those Senators who voted "nay" on the Resolution and President
Eisenhower were liable to be a trifle cool. It may be that the Democratic
victory in the 1951* Congressional elections, leading to a Democratic majority
in the Senate, was by way of an advantage to President Eisenhower in the long run.
In concluding this discussion of the censure debate, we might pose the
questioni Why did McCarthy not apologise for his actions, thereby obviating
any need for the Senate proceedings that led to his condemnation? Senator
Fulbright was of the opinion, in a clear allusion to the Wisconsin Senator,
that, as in the 1929 censure case of Senator Bingham, an apology would have led
to the dropping of charges, 3 but McCarthy, following Bingham's example,
refused to recant. Richard Rovere has indicated some of the reasons for this
stand. First, McCarthy would have felt that he was letting down his two main
supporters in the Senate, Herman Welker and William Jenner. Second, McCarthy
wae a fighter with little Intention of retreat in the face of adversity.!* What
could have ended in an apology ended in condemnation.
^ftew York Times , December 2nd, 1951*.
^Congressional Quarterly, Almanac , Vol. X, p. l»70.
3congressional Record , Vol. 100, Part 10, p. 12906.
%overe, og. clt., pp. 56-57.
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IV. Summary
Although the events of 195^ marked some dark hours in McCarthy's career,
he was not completely finished by the end of the year, but he had begun a
precipitous decline in influence. The public had seen his methods at work in
the Army-McC arthy hearings and had, at least to some extent, reacted unfavorably,
although, we admit, this finding is based more in subjective observations
than in empirioal data.
The Republicans had started out 195^ in control of the Senate, but
by the end of the year had lost that control through the Congressional elections,
rfith this loss, McCarthy lost his powerful chairmanships of the Committee on
Government Operations and of its Subcommittee on Permanent investigations.
His Congressional base of operations had all but disappeared. But it is well
to remember here that half of the Republican members of Congress had voted
against Resolution 301, and, as Rovere remarks, it was "by and large the more
influential half."1
President Eisenhower had evidently endorsed the action which the Senate
had taken. As far as he was concerned this was a satisfactory conclusion to
an affair which he regarded as the business of Congress. The Republicans
in the Senate with little active participation on the part of their party
leader had dealt with their own problem child. Whether such orocedure was
the most efficacious is a problem with which we shall deal in our concluding
chapter.
The 83rd Congress had provided Senator McCarthy with a large portion of
the foundation of his influence. The year 195^ through a combination of
political action on behalf of the Senate and luck, in the emergence of a
Ubid
. , p. 234.
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Democratic majority in the Senate through Congressional elections, had
largely diminished the Wisconsin Senator's power. But, had the Senate acted
soon enough or sufficiently strongly? Had President Eisenhower used his
influence to a great enough extent? Could it have been, more broadly, that
the political system contingent upon the McCarthyiet problem was derelict in
its duty? These questions, amongst others, we will attempt to answer in the
succeeding chapter.
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CHAPTER VI
Conceptual Analysis
In this chapter we return to some of the ideas which were tentatively
outlined in Chapter I. We are concerned here to carry out two tasks: first,
to postulate a conceptual framework of some predictive value, and, second,
to apply this framework to the case of the political demise of Senator Joseph
McCarthy. It is our contention, as we hope to show, that it is possible to
evolve a theory on the basis of the McCarthy affair which may be of relevance
to political decision makers.
I. The Conceptual Framework
A. The Problem Stated
.
In building our framework for analysis we hope that it need not exist
on a purely theoretical level. The objective has been to erect a practically
applicable model, to establish, as Louis Halle would say, conceptual order
from the chaotic existential world.1 We are aware, therefore, that the political
scientist is more concerned with models of limited use rather than with those
of the universal type. We are, in Professor Shackle's words more of a "fox,"
that is concerned with building one amongst a variety of particular theories
as stepping stones to more all-inclusive theories of social action. Our objective
is, then, modest but, nevertheless, fraught with many dangers, the most important
of which, we re-emphasize, is falling prey to building static idealistic models
which do not take sufficient account of the dynamic existential world.
lSee, Louis Halle, The Society of Han, (New York! Harper and Row,
1966), Chapters 1 and 2.
8?
Of somewhat lsss importance is the question which asks, can there truly
be such an act as making a decision? In a daterminlst view of history, as
Professor Shackle has observed, there can be no real decision making, since
decision Involves choice, and this latter does not exist for the determinlst
since there can be only one decision he can make in any one olrcumstanee.
A similar position occurs if we view the decision maker as able to list all
the possible courses open to him, and subsequently coming to a decision when
he chooses the most attractive of the available alternatives. Such an idealistic
method of reaching a decision has been characterized as "synoptic,"2 It bears
some resemblance to the deterministic position in that certain alternatives
present themselves to the decision-maker in relatively simple form. As far
as we are concerned, both the "synoptic" and determinlst views of decision,
making must be rejected. The former approach suffers the limitation, amongst
others, of failing to take cognisance of the existential world in which it is
impossible to rank all the available alternatives relevant to a decision merely
because of the astronomical amount of factual data with which a decision maker
would have to deal. 3 The latter approach, as Shackle has pointed out, must be
rejected since decision in a determlnist sense is no decision at allj it is,
in fact, eapty.^ rfe are, therefore, left implanted firmly in a real world
where every problem involves uncertainty to greater or lesser degree, and.
Moreover, a world In which political problems are more often alleviated than
3olved.
^G. L. S. Shackle, The Nature of Economic Thought
.
Cambridge! Cambridge
University Press, 1966), Chapter 6 and pp. 86-87.
2 David Sraybrooke and Charles 3. Lindblom, A Strategy of Decision
.
(Hew
York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), pp. 37-^1."
3see, ibid., pp. ^7-57.
*G. L. S. Shackle, Decision
.
Order and Time
.
(Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1961), p.T".
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The conceptual and existential worlds are constantly interacting
vith each other, each one modifying the other. 1 Perhaps one of the greatest
tragedies of the twentieth century has been the attempt by Marxist* to sake
the existential world conform to their concept of the world as it should be.
There is no clearer example of the folly of stressing the conceptual at the
expense of the existential. 2 *'• wish, in our analysis, to avoid pressing the
facts as they exist into a preconceived pattern. Rather, the facts themselves
have largely shaped a concept which has been developed from this point to
further explain the facts, and which may be of more general predictive value.
In our search for seise basis from which to start a theoretical interpreta-
tion of the decline in McCarthy's political power, it occured to us that the
field of economic analysis night offer us fertile ground. Seme of tlie reasons
for this being so should be stated here. First, Keynesian economic analysis
has been increasingly concerned with the study of dynamic, rather than of
static, economic equilibria, and dynamics is "a scheme of calculation of the
future from the past."3 it ic our intention to stress the dynamic aspects of
the political system. Second, the distinction made in economic analysis between
events of short run and long run importance is also valuable for political
science, since it nay enable us to distinguish between those facets of the
political system which are worthy of immediate attention and those widen nay
be subject to treatment in the more distant future, or over a long period of
time. In both cases, it will be noticed, we are concerned with movement.
This is our main task - to provide some theory which will be pertinent to
explaining an other than a static world. We too infrequently remember in any
%alle, op_. cit., p. 126 and Chapter 7, passim .
2Cee, ibid , Chapters li—7.
^Shackle, The Nature of Economic Thought, p. 82.
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but an uninterested fashion that, "The present is saturated with the past
and pregnant with the future." 1
Our problem, very basically, is to provide a conceptual order for the
events surrounding McCarthy's political decline which will help us understand
the chaotic real world as it existed then and as it may exist in the future.
As with any theory, it must, to a large extent, be tentative in nature and
inevitably needful of future revision. Dynamic society does not tarry for
the theories which explain and interpret it.
9 « The Significant Event and the Daclclon-j laker .
McCarthy's behavior and the reactions to it in 1953 and Ifjt provide
political data which is of relevance to the idea of a political system. We
would wish to interpret the scope of political science as being coincidental
with the political system, however large or small. A political system has
been defined as "any persistent pattern of human relationships that involves,
to a significant extent, power, rule, or authority."2 David Baston has
provided, in addition, the observation that the boundaries of a political
system are molded by the extent to which a system is able to make binding
decisions upon its members. 3 A political system, therefore, may be interpreted
in a broad sense. For our purposes, such an interpretation is not disingenuous.
We hope to be able to provide an analysis of the McCarthy demise which will be
of some general relevance to all types of political systems.
We are concerned initially with dealing with the problem of time which
faces any decision-maker, particularly with those individuals who must make
decisions at a high level in the governmental machinery. It is clear that a
Leibnitz quoted in Halle, op_. cit., p. 152.
2Hobert A. Dahl, og. cit., p. 6.
JDavid Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems."
World Politics
.
Vol. IX, (1956-1957), p. 385.
92
member of an executive branch in any government is inevitably involved with
attaching priorities to the business which he must transact. Seme problems vdll
require immediate attention, others, while still requiring some sort of
decision, may be left to a later date. The dilemma of the decision-maker is
to attach significances to the information before him so that he may, if only
vaguely, rank them in order of importance.
Some decisions can be implemented at once, or in the immediate future}
they are thus what we may characterise as Bhort run decision phenomena , even
though the outcome of the decision made may have consequences over a long period
of time. Other decisions are of a long run nature, often involving sequences
of many decisions and supplemental decision which can only be implemented more
slowly; these we may call long run decision phenomena . To complete the picture,
we may say that decision phenomena which are of neither long or short run nature
may be characterised as intermediate run decision phenomena . Merely to ascribe
this nomenclature to political information does not by itself help the decision
maker in a political system to choose which decisions he should make first.
Somehow significances must be attached to the facts which have been gleaned by
the Individual who must make a decision. It should be borne in mind, too, that
a decision need not be a positive act. Deciding to take no action is as much
a decision as deciding to act.
Much of what transpires in any political system will be deemed unworthy
of the making of a decision by those in authority, either because of lack of
time or because what has taken place is deemed insignificant. But how do any
of those persons in the decision making process decide what is significant and
what is insignificant? The choices of the decision-maker are vital to the
equilibrium of the political system, since demands (inputs) on the political
system must be balanced, to some degree, by the decisions (outputs) made by
it. 1 The question of equilibrium is, as in economics, of prime importance.
llbid., pp. 396-397. See, also, David Easton, A Systems Analysis of
PoliticalTire, (New Yorkj John Wiley, 1965), pp. 19-21.
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Our first task than, must be to locate the framework in which disequilib-
rium may occur, «Ve may call an event in the purview of the decision-maker
which threatens the equilibrium of the political system a politically sig-
nificant event . Further, we give the definition of such an event thusi an
occ urrenc e or stance which directly , or indirectly , may have a dis equilibrating
effect upon a political system , the continues existence of which is generally
r«g«rdec as desirable by its members
. If, at first glance, this appears to
be a definition which is conservatively biased, we believe that on inspection
this would no longer appear so. Whatever the political system in question,
we are suggesting, its essentials, however much the superstructure of the system
is altered, can only be maintained if decisions are made which will restore an
equilibrium to the system. The equilibrium need not be identical to that
which existed before the disturbance occurred, in most cases it cannot be the
same. Generally speaking, returns to pre-existing equilibria are associateo
with reactionary politics, and even they cannot, of course, avoid all political
movement, rfe must add that many contributing equilibria go to make up the
balance for the whole political system - a disturbance of one of these lesser
equilibria is, obviously, capable of disturbing the overall balance, and
frequently does so. The parallel with economic analysis will be noticed once
again.
The concept of the significant event can be broken down into composite
parts so that we may be able to distinguish events of differing levels of
significance. (This breakdown will enable us to combine the concepts of long
and short run decision phenomena with that of the significant event). The
decision-maker, as we have pointed out, must have some method of ranking
politically significant events if he is to know which ones he should tackle
first. Common sonse tells us that decisions are made approximately according
to some such ranking, 'rfhat we propose to show is that in breaking down the
significant event we are both explaining, to some extent, the actions of the
uian in authority and, at the same tine, offering a tentative framework which
could offer some guidance to the decision-makin;; machinery.
Je may divide the significant event into throe categories, primary,
secondary and tertiary, broadly, the ranking denotes the degree o? Importance
which the decisioiwnaker attaches to the decision making problem at hand.
Although there are some coincidences, the degree of speed with which a policy
can be implemented is not necessarily coincidental with the degree of importance
of the event. Thus, for example, too most important events are not necessarily
short run decision phenomena. Events of primary significance are those
happenings whioh obviously, and immediately, threaten the dynamic equilibrium
of a political s/staa, and which may wall be destructive of the essence, as
well as the trappings, of the system. In a nation-state, examples which might
be given are invasion or civil war. In an interest group an example might exist
in legislation whic.i was aLaad at effectively crippling the organization; anti-
trade union legislation, as in nineteenth century 3reat Britain, readily comes
to mind, iivents of primary significance are usually amongst short run decision
pnenomena since they are needf ol, and capable, of an immediate decision. This
fact tends to place them in the domain of economics and politics, rather
than in the sphere of the other social sciences.
fivents of secondary significance are more complicated. Whereas events
of primary significance are overt, those of secondary significance tend to be
more latent, and thus more difficult to detect. Occurrences which are not
obviously destructive of the political 3ystea, or which do not seen, at first
glance, to threaten the equilibrium of the system, we term events of secondary
significance
.
Bvents of secondary significance are generally occurrences
which take place over a period of time and which may be subject to a sequence
of decisions concerning them, ror reasons which will become apparent, such
events are not classified as long run decision pnenomena, but rather as
intermediate run decision phenomena. An example of this type of event would
be the struggle of the American Negro for civil rights since the end of the
Second World War.
Events of tertiary significance are concerned entirely with long run
decision phenomena, that is, with situations that are not amenable to change
except over the long run, and which political decisions cannot change except In
the long run. The main areas of concern here are social and psychological
factors. It is clear, we think, that social mores and psychological attributes
are only changeable by decisions of which it may be extremely difficult to see
the long run effects, this is an area where the decision-naker must grope
forward as best he can, and where, more so than in the other two classifica-
tions of events, his objective may be thwarted by happenings over which he has
little or no control.
riefore departing from this aspect of the conceptual analysis, there are
some problems concerned with it which are deserving of some attention. First,
it is possible, of course, that overlap can occur between the three levels of
significance, but we do not believe that this detracts from the framework as a
whole as an instrument of political analysis, and, perhaps, of political action.
It would be foolhardy to suppose that we can divide significant events into
watertight compartments. Second, we are, as we have mentioned, involved, to
some extent, in the area of values. In the sense that a political leader may
believe that the ends of, say, his social club are desirable, we are suggesting
a method by whloh the desired ends may have some chance of achievement. Such
a background of values, we believe, does not jeopardize our analysis by making
it normative. Third, there are bound to be conflicts between short, inter-
mediate, and long run decision phenomena. The balancing of these conflicts
Is necessary if the equilibrium of tne political system, which, as we have
observed, is a dynamic equilibrium
, is to be maintained. A clear example of
such conflict today can be seen in the attempts by the U. S. government to
provide for a burgeoning economy at home while fighting a war in Vietnam.
Fourth, it may seem that we are no more than borrowing Lindblom and Braybrooke's
analysis of decision-making. Their division of the decision-making process
broadly into incremental and non-incremental changes, that is, into policies
which are merly added to incrementally, and those that can be classed as
major social changes, is of relevance to us. Events of secondary and tertiary
significance inevitably lead to incremental policy making. He are more con-
cerned, however, with making decisions in order of importance vis-a-vis the
equilibrium of the political systems in this task Lindblom and Braybrooke'
s
analysis is of prime importance , for, amongst other things, they have produced
a cogent empirically based explanation of how political decisions are made,
tfe hope that our explanation is of wider proportions, with emphasis on the
relative importance to the decision-maker of what we have termed significant
events
.
II. McCarthy and his Political Environment
.
The years 1953 and 19$*, which mark the zenith of Senator McCarthy's
influence, are particularly interesting in terms of our conceptual analysis.
Events of primary significance do not directly interest us in this period _
we are more concerned, as we will show, with events of secondary and tertiary
significance. Further, we hope to be able to situate the reactions to these
significant events in such a way that some conceptual order may be established
from the "chaotic existential world" as it existed during these years.
ISee, Lindblom and Braybrooke, op_. cit. , Chapters 4 and 5.
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A. Events of Secondary Significance .
In this section we Intend to deal with . cCarthy's relations with
President Eisenhower and with the 83rd Congress.
President Eisenhower was preoccupied immediately before and after his
election to office with a least one event of primary significance - the Korean
Jar. It appears that the specter of Joseph :icCarthy did not loon large upon
his horizon. When the President finally became aware of the gravity of the
situation, we shall argue, McCarthy was certainly of secondary significance,
and, yet, Eisenhower did not treat him as such in the decisions which he made
concerning him. Elsenhower's perception of the existential world, to use
Halle's nomenclature, was, to some extent, distorted by his conceptual vision
of what it should have been - a situation which could have possibly led to
tragic consequences.-*- From all indications, as we have pointed out in
Chapter IV above, Elsenhower's concept of the Presidency was more inclined to
the Xaftlan view than the 'ioosveltian. This concept of the office, however,
loosely formed in Elsenhower's own mind, had important repercussions on the
existential world. An event of secondary significance, simply the importance
of licCarthy in America, was recognized by the administration, but the Elsenhower
view of the office of President was such as to cause difficulty in dealing with
it. McCarthy, as we have mentioned, was capable of jeopardizing the Republican
equilibrium by splitting it over the issue of Communism In government. 2 Al-
though this is a contributing equilibrium, it Is evident that moves away from
that equilibrium could have repercussions in terras of disturbing the equilibrium
of the political system of the United State3 as a whole . Eisenhower's reaction
clearly portrays the division between his conceptual world and the world as
ISee above, Chapter IV, pp. 11-12.
2See above, Chapter IV, pp. 11-12.
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it then existed. The President was concerned that he should not, as he put it,
"get into the gutter," with McCarthy, or indeed, encroach upon the power of the
legislature. The decision not to do anything directly was, of course, a policy
decision of possibly large scale dimensions. The unwillingness, or inability,
to recognize this problem as being an event of secondary significance inclined
the President to throw the difficulty into the lap of the Congress. Moreover,
from the outset of his campaign for the Presidency, it would appear that
Eisenhower did rot recognise that his attitude toward McCarthy was jeopardizing
his position of power, and, thus, once again, was threatening the basic
equilibrium of the political system. It was not a matter of morality to con-
demn McCarthy for some of the actions he took, but it was a matter of political
exigency
.
Possibly the clearest example which will substantiate this line of
thought is Eisenhower in his role as commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
Matters which concern the armed forces are both of primary and secondary sig-
nificance, since in war time decisions concerning them pertain directly to the
existence of the American political system, while in peace time, generally
speaking, decisions concerning them may be decided over the intermediate run.
That Eisenhower had put his position as commander-in-chief in jeoparc'y is
attested to by Hanson Baldwin who observed that McCarthy's investigations of the
Army in late 1953 and early 19$h had lowered the morale of officers, and had
led to a situation where Eisenhower was sharing command of the Army with
Senator McCarthy. 1 McCarthy, in investigating the Army and using the methods
that he did, it may be argued, was encroaching upon the executive domain, thus
threatening any meaningful interpretation of the separation of powers. Eisen-
hower, it seems, was remiss in not observing the level of significance widen
McCarthy's action had achieved. Whereas Eisenhower could have spoken out
hew York Times , February 28, 1$%.
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immediately, he chose to leave the final burden of scuttling McCarthy's ship
to a more cumbersome vessel, that of Congress. The dangers in doing so,
in putting the problem into the hands of the legislature which is by nature
more adept at dealing with more long run problems, were immense, since many
of McCarthy's actions needed swift replies which carried considerable weight -
only the Presidency carried sufficient weight to provide meaningful replies.
President Eisenhower, it appears, was not enough of a politician to know
when his bases of power, which are essential to maintaining the dynamic equi-
librium of the political system, were being seriously threatened. Events of
secondary significance, such as McCarthy's usurpation of executive power and
its attendant implications, do not appear to have been fully perceived by
Eisenhower, ciis lack of awareness of that precious Presidential commodity,
political power, was limited. As Erwin C. Hargrove has remarked, "Eisenhower
enjoyed being President, but he did not seek the office as a vehicle of personal
power."^-
Eisenhower, on hindsight, appears to have been unable to see the levels
of significance connected with his dealings with McCarthy, or further, that
levels of significance are inter-connected and nay escalate so that one level
spills over into a higher level of significance. (This process, of course,
may be reversed.) out after all is said and done, Eisenhower was limited in
his actions concerning McCarthy because of his reluctance to modify his concept
of his office to suit the world as it existed. If McCarthy's performance had
become an event of primary significance Eisenhower would certainly have had
grounds to act on the basis of his own concepts. It was Congressional action
which finally obviated this necessity.
lErwin C. Hargrove, Presidential Leadership , Personality and Political
Style
.
(Hew Yorki Kacmlllan, 1966), p. 125.
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Congress, as has been shown, 1 was ambivalent in its attitude toward
McCarthy. Once again, it is clear that sane members of the Senate were not
aware of the dls-equilibrating possibilities in McCarthy's actions. The Senate,
in addition, being a deliberative assembly, can seldom act with great rapidity.
The few occasions on which it can do so are usually when an event of primary
significance is imminent or has happened. The length of time which the Senat«
took in dealing with McCarthy, especially after Eonroney's denunciation of bin
in July of 1953, is indicative of their perception of the threat which McCarthy
presented to the political systems of the Senate itself and to the United States
in general. What we are suggesting here is not that the Senate acted in the
wrong way, but that it failed to take action, to make a positive decision, where
some sort of positive decision was necessary. It was not, after all, until
eighteen months after Monroney's attack on McCarthy's methods that the Senate
decided whether McCarthy was deserving of censure or not. Whether a person
was for or against McCarthy does not necessarily distort the picture of the man
in the total political system. One had only to follow the newspaper headlines
to know that McCarthy was an important figure in the political system. But
the Senate, being what it waB, was only capable, except in exceptional cir-
cumstances, of treating McCarthy as a long run decision phenomenon, when, In
fact, he was in that category we have called a short run decision phenomenon.
McCarthy's activities could have been dealt with rapidly had the Senate a
mind to do so. Senator Joseph Clark has succinctly pointed up this lack of
perception by Congress in suggesting that this great legislative body conceives
that doing nothing is not making a decision when, in effect, it is quite the
reverse.2
lsee above, Chapter V.
2Joseph S. Clark, Congress : The Sapless Branch , (New Torki Harper and
Row, 1961t), p. 11*7.
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It may be speculated that Congress' conception of itself has come to be
truly out of step with what it must be if it is to adapt to the existential
world. Senator Everett Dirksen, in a speech on November 21st, 1963, had this to
say concerning the Senate. It "is much like an old scow. It does not move
fast; it does not move very far at one time; but it does not sink."* rfe might
remark that an old scow cannot fight polaris submarines, for such is our age.
It may be, too, that the Congress does not wish to perceive the levels
of significance of various events, since these events might call for action
which would be so precipitate as to destroy the conceptions of Congress held
by some of the members of that august body. In other words, we are saying that
the perception of the significant event by some members of Congress might
seriously jeopardize their own conception of the way in which Congress should
operate. Our analysis, using the phraseology of the significant event, is, we
suggest, closely connected with the problem of the gap which exists between the
conceptual and the existential worlds. Further, this division between what we
perceive and what exists in reality is mirrored in the probability that pre-
diction frequently has wish-fulfilling characteristics. 2 what we often interpret,
on hindsight, is what we would wish to have happened. In other words, we squeeze
the existential world into the preconceived pattern of the conceptual world.
The whole problem of ascribing levels of significance to events is not
merely one of attaching measures of importance to each level. For various reasons
it is quite possible, and often, we would venture, probable, that the decision-
maker in whatever type of political system, is unwilling to see an event as of
a certain level of significance if this level cannot somehow be incorporated
into his own conceptual world. 3 The implications of such an argument, it will
^•Quoted in Ibid
. , p. 130.
2See, Toch, loc. cit.
, p. 62.
3See, Halle, op_. cit
.. Chapter 3.
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be agreed, are enormous. Inflexibility, whether amongst statesmen, political
scientists r others, is, in many situations, a characteristic which we abhor.
To conclude. Congress, in its view of what American government should be,
in its view, more specifically, of the separation of powers, has produced some
dangerous tendencies in terms of the maintenance of a dynamic political equili-
brium. Senator Clark In referring to ;-toCarthy*s actions in 1953 and 1954 writes,
Such aggressive threats i.e., .icCarthy's activities to constitutional
government and the national welfare were, no doubt, extreme. But in our
time Congress has recourse more and more to the use of the Investigating
coranittee as it becomes more and more frustrated in its battle for power
with the executive branch.
In a period when, as a result of the Cold War, demagogues of a nationally
disruptive nature are liable to arise, Congress may offer them a potential
home inside the machinery of government so that they can, possibly, as
.lOCarthy did, attack the executive branch of government.
B. Events of Tertiary Significance
.
Sociological and psychological problems of the nature which we have put
forward in Chapter III are only amenable to long terra treatment - they are,
in our terms, long run decision phenomena. Frequently the decision-maker, as
we have observed, will be groping forward In an area in which there are so
many variables that making policy, because of the nature of the problems
involved, must be Incremental.
Svents of tertiary significance can be understood best if we say that
alleviating them involves changing or modifying environmental factors which bear
upon the political system. This is, inevitably, an area of immensely wide
scope, but it is, nevertheless, an area in which decision-makers must act.
Decision is necessary here because, however incomplete the information and final
objectives may oe, events of tertiary significance can spill over Into higher
^lark, op_. clt .. pp. 85-86.
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levels of significance, thus increasing the chances of Jeopardizing the equili-
brium of the political system involved. This being the case, how can the
decision-maker deal with the sociological and psychological foundations of
McCarthy's support?
It is all too easy and, we think, almost inevitable, to platitudinize
where events of tertiary significance are concerned. The authoritarian per-
sonality, as outlined by McCloeky, Llpset and Ferris, 1 is amenable only to very
extended treatment by the decision-maker, liis status anxieties, his socio-
economic background and so on, can only be dealt with when large structural
changes are made in our social, economic and political systems. These change*
are liable to be made through a series of incremental policies. Any solution
to this particular problem, as such, will only be proximate. If past history
is anything by which to Judge, alleviation of social problems in particular
lags behind the need for such treatment. The reasons for this need not detain
us - suffice it to say that tertiary problems are of an extended long run nature.
In the area of decision-making in connection with events of tertiary
significance, problems may seem insurmountable if the decision-maker believes
he must solve them. If, on the other hand, meaningful alleviation is stressed
rather than solution, then the decision-maker may make decisions. Faced with
the problem of those people who feel themselves to be alienated from society,
people who are often attracted to extremist politics, the decision-maker may
implement meaningful alleviatory decisions. The recent example of civil
rights legislation pertaining to Negroes would bear out this point. Many
Negroes have been amongst the declasses of American society; legislation by
itself does not immediately bring them "back into society," but it does con-
tribute toward that final objective. Thus, too, decisions in the area of the
isee above, pp. 32-31*.
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economic system may le»d to the raising of the standards of living of America's
poorer population. This, in turn, is inclined to lead these people away from
extremist politics of the nature which McCarthy's influence encouraged.
Events of tertiary significance are, then, capable of alleviation rather
than solution. The equilibrium of the political system is threatened if the
decision-maker is overwhelmed by what seem to be gargantuan problems incapable
of solution. The value of seeing the importance of events of tertiary sig-
nificance, with which the political system must somehow deal, cannot be
stressed too highly. In addition, incremental policies are the modus operandi
for the decision-maker once this factor has been absorbed by the decision-
maker himself.
III. Summary
Political events, which may be interpreted as one occurrence or a series
of occurrences, may be divided into three levels of significance, primary,
secondary, and tertiary. Associated with each level of significance is the
speed with which the deci3ion-maker may deal with these occurrences and the
machinery available to him to enable hira to do so. If the decision can be
implemented at once, then we call this possibility a short run decision
phenomenon. If the decision can be implemented in the near future, we call
this possibility an intermediate run decision phenomenon. Similarly, if a
decision can only be implemented sequentially over the extended long run, we
call this type of decision a long run decision phenomenon. The main distinc-
tion between each of these levels is the means that the decision-maker has
available to enable him to implement a decision. These divisions, while to
some extent paralleling the events of varying degrees of significance show
the problems with which the decision-maker can, not should, deal sooner, rather
than later. The long, intermediate and short run decision phenomena describe
the rapidity with which a decision can be made with the means available.
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alssnhower and the Congress did not approach the .lcCarthy problem
which each knew to exist, in a sufficiently swift way. There are, briefly,
four reasons for this state of affairs. First, neither party's conceptual
view of the political system approximated, to a large enough degree, the
exigencies of the existential political 3ystem. Second, neither Eisenhower
nor Congress seoned aware of the level of significance into which McCarthy's
activities fell. Third, Eisenhower fait that McCarthy did not fall into that
category of decisions concerning which he could act at once. That is,
SLsenhower felt that the McCarthy event was not a short run decision phenomenon.
Fourth, Congress, by its naturo, ssldoa treats any event as other than an
intermediate or long run decision phenomenon. It acts, therefore, deliberately
and somewhat slowly.
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:MPi3it vii
:onclasio)i
The maintenance of balance within a political system is necessary if
that political system is to prevail over a long period of time. All political
systems, of whatever size, are subjected to forces which may seriously impair or,
in fact, destroy their dynamic equilibrium. The United States had not seen
without its fair share of 3uch dls equilibrating factors. We have argued that
iteCarthy was a person about whom, and, partially, at the instigation of whom,
the extreme right of the American political system flourished.
Stable political systems have been capable of withstanding severe dis-
ruptive factors providing that they existed within a favorable environment.
(In the United States, the Civil War comes to mind). At some periods in history,
however, there are events which signifloantly alter the environment in which a
political system may exist. The spectacular rise of two large-scale Communist
powers, Russia and China, especially since the end of the Second World War,
has materially altered the political situations of the democratic countries of
the western hemisphere. This 13 particularly so in relation to Russia, since
she now has a capacity in nuclear weaponry which approaches parity with that
of the United States. Real or imagined, the Soviet Union and Communist China
are seen 'zry most Americans as posing some kind of threat to America and her
allies. For many Americans this is not merely an external threat; Communist
subversion is also perceived as jeopardizing the persistence of the American
political system from wltliin. And the very nature of the postulated "threat"
makes it clear for many Americans who the "enemy" Is. In starting from a
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position based In fact. Senator McCarthy took the fears arising from these
conceptions and harped on them until, for his supporters. Communist countries,
and more particularly Communist organizations and Communist sympathizers In
America, could be blamed for most of America's ills. The history of Soviet
Russia and, more recently, of Communist China, incline us to the belief that
the leadership In these two countries, that Is the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union and the Communist Party of China, tend to harbor similar types of belief
about the "bourgeois capitalists" of the West. The mutual threat, as It is
perceived, is, therefore, an instrument which can be used in both cases to whip
up enthusiasm against "subversives" at home or "aggressors" overseas. Mc-
Carthy recognized, as much as Mao Xse lung recognizes, the efficacy of such
slogans in forwarding personal power. The state of Cold War is liable to
persist in the foreseeable future, and is thus fruitful ground for the poli-
tician who wishes to find a subject in which everything is "clear" and easily
presentable to the public on whose support he must ride to power. In the
Chinese political system, for instance, such threats can be used to whip up
support for the system. In America too, this may happen. There is more chance
of such activities jeopardizing the American political system, however, than
there is of their throwing the Chinese system into disarray. In the final
analysis, we may argue that such appeals to unique sources of subversion at
home and abroad are more dysfunctional to the American political system than
they would be for example, to the Soviet Union. The reason for this is that
in Communist countries it Is generally easier to control such movements since
they are usually Initiated by the ruling authorities. Such may not be the case
in America, butttils does not mean that the governmental authorities are In
no position to act.
Senator i-fcCarthy attracted to his support many of the extreme right wing
in American politics. Many of these people so attracted are, as we have shown.
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least likely to adhere to democratic principles In settling their differences
with their fellow men. The Ideology that pertains to Communism gives many of
them something to rail against. The radical right wing, with the exception of
McCarthy, has not been able to produce a national leader around whom to rally.
That McCarthy has been their only true national leader, adept at attracting all
degrees of right wing conservatives to his banner, does not mean that his type
of leadership, such as it was, will not arise again. If it does arise, and the
democratic system should be aware of such contingencies, the equilibrium of the
political system must be better defended.
Planning for the future is frequently carried out on the basis of exist-
ing conditions, or existing policies. In other words, existing contingencies nay
appear to have passed out of the decision-makers purview when a policy con-
cerning the contingencies has been implemented. It is possible that policies
may not really deal with the core of a problem, but may, rather, produce a
symbol which indicated that the problem has been disposed of, when in reality
it still exists. Thus, having "successfully concluded" the McCarthy event,
the problem may be put aside. Such a conclusion is not only erroneous, but
dangerous too. iioCarthy, as we have remarked, was brought down by a combina-
tion of luck and decisions made by Congress, President Elsenhower and, above
all, by McCarthy himself. The former, the fact that the Republican party lost
control of the Senate in the 195** Congressional elections, was as important,
we believe, in bringing down McCarthy as were the deliberate decisions. It
is difficult to predict what might have been the situation had the Republicans
held control of the Senate in the 195^ elections.
Had ..cCarthy been a more complete politician he might have concentrated
on two areas where he was particularly weak. First, in building up some kind
of political organization which could have provided a permanent base from
which he could have worked. Second, in tempering his own natural inclination
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to be loyal to his staff where it could in no sense be to his advantage to be
so. A more adroit politician might be able to increase his leverage consider-
ably were he to take such considerations into account. If McCarthy had himself
taken such precautions it might have been very much more difficult for either
Congress or the President to take steps against him.
A McCarthy type demagogue is a contingency worthy of some planning in the
democratic political system. Planning could be inestimably helped if the policy-
makers who might be connected with such a figure were aware of the relation-
ships between their conceptual world and the existential world. To provide a
framework for such clarification is, indeed, taking into account the stubborn-
ness of human nature, somewhat presumptuous. However, by giving a broad initial
conceptual structure, which we have attempted to do, it may be possible to build
a more intricate model which would considerably refine the original crude con-
cept. By interpreting the events which occur in the political system in terms
of levels of significance, we may move away from the area of interpretation into
the realm of a possible model for the decision-maker.
It seems to us that, throughout the years 1953 and W^. both the
executive and legislative branches of the government failed to perceive the
priorities which McCarthy was beginning to impose at a number of differing
levels of the governmental structure. Whether either branch of the government
wished to make policy concerning him or not, the time approached at which
positive policy, as opposed to the policy of doing nothing, or as little as
possible, would have to be carried out. Both branches of government were
reluctant to make policy of a positive nature even when that time had arrived.
Fundamentally, the reasons for such vacillation were, we have indicated, based
in the dichotomy, which each nurtured, between their conceptions of political
life and how political life actually exists. However slow the process, political
exigency finally overcame what those persons in the political act considered
no
ought to happen.
Eisenhower, by the nature of the office which he occupied, probably
had more possibilities open to him concerning I'.cCarthy's activities than any
other part of the American government. The President, however, failed to see
that not only was the McCarthy event one which was in the category of short
run decision phenomenon, but also that by not speaking out openly against
McCarthy he was both undermining his own authority in the executive branch of
government, and also setting some harmful precedents for legislative inter-
ference in activities that properly belonged to the executive, ills decision to
do nothing, or next to nothing, in connection with McCarthy was not simply
harmful to himself, it also jeopardized the office that he occupied, other
members of the executive and the proper relationship between Congress and the
President. Such implications which grew from the lack of action on the part
of the President were, we suggest, capable of destroying equilibrium within the
political system.
In terms of the more extended long run problems of American society,
environmental changes are going to be, and, in fact, are of prime importance.
We do not doubt that environment is, to a large degree, responsible for forming
the political characteristics of a population. If the United States government
cannot, or does not wish to, change the kind of environment which, we have
good reason to believe, helps to produce extremist politics, then the American
political system may be faced with serious disruptive factors. The alteration
of the environment of the political system is, as David Easton would conceive
it, necessary in some degree to the persistence of the system. A lack of some
correspondence between each may be seriously dysfunctional to the system itself.
Hence, societal factors, psychological, sociological and economic, bear an
important relationship to the political system. What the political system does
in relation to these environmental factors thus reflects back upon the system and
partially determines its ability to survive. However much we grope forward,
making decisions concerning events of tertiary significance, we may advance
towards the alleviation, if not the solution, of problems connected with
environmental factors.
We have made some very limited and, what we might call, peripheral pre-
dictions in our study of McCarthy at his zenith. We have stated that another
demagogic type similar to McCarthy could arise. If such a political actor
should arise, then, for the sake of continuing dynamic equilibrium in the
political system, the system should be prepared to deal with such a personage.
Responsibilities within the American governmental system are intentionally
divided, and, yet, in times of crisis unity is achieved. But times of crisis
are, sometimes, not recognized as such even by the governmental machinery.
Recognition of latent crisis is more difficult. We have attempted to show
why it must be located and dealt with and why, if not dealt with, crisis may
escalate to more significant levels. The McCarthy event, for all the publicity
which it received, was not attacked as it should have been if the interests of
the political system were to be forwarded. Hindsight, we are aware, creates
order from the "chaotic existential world." Nevertheless, lessons of history
are frequently forgotten. Because McCarthy is dead, personalities of his ilk
have not vanished, nor have the conditions which give rise to them.
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ABSTRACT
Political action rests, to some extent, on the ability to for
future contingencies. If political systems are to achieve their primary aim,
persistence, then foresight, and decisions based on foresight, must be taken
into serious consideration.
Senator Joseph McCarthy was a political personage who nay be viewed
as part of a tradition of American demagoguery. He was significantly different
free preceding demagogues in at least one important respect. The nature of Ms
appeal, the threat arising from Communist subversion within the United States,
was one which cut across class lines and was formulated in easily digestible
shape. The conditions which gave rise to McCarthy's peculiar brand of political
action are not missing at the present time. It is quite possible that another
person of McCarthy's ilk may arise in the future. To understand this possi-
bility and to deal with it, it is necessary to know, first, where McCarthy's
support came from.
Certain persons in society, it is well known, feel alienated. Those
who are in this state are particularly ripe for appeals from extremist
politicians. In America, where the extreme left has atrophied, this appeal ie
likely to come from the extreme right. Psychological factors reinforce this
picture. Authoritarian personalities, are most often those individuals who are
alienated fron society. Frequently these groups suffer from quasi-paranoia,
constantly fearing conspiracies and the like. These types of persons are
susceptible to appeals from the radical right in the style of Joseph McCarthy.
Political support fro McCarthy came from the Republicans ' tacit
acceptance of him and his role—he was seen as a useful thorn in the flesh
of the Democrats. In addition, his position of Senator gave him immunities and
privileges which offered a relatively safe base for his political activities.
President Eisenhower's attitude toward McCarthy was no less important
in giving this latter politician support. Although the President found McCarthy
and his activities repulsive, he nevertheless pursued a policy of non-
recognition of the KcCarthyist phenomenon and the problems it posed. He felt
that Congress was the body which was responsible for dealing with the Senator.
Eisenhower's concept of the Presidential office seriously blocked his awareness
of the threat which McCarthy posed to Presidential power. Moreover, the
President's appointments in his administration were not carefully sifted to
ensure protection from possible KcCarthyist subterfuges in the executive branch
of government.
Congress realized comparatively slowly the danger which McCarthy posed,
not only to Congress, but also to the whole national government. In hoping to
neutralize the Senator, a seemingly innocuous chairmanship was given to him,
but this proved a tactical mistake. The Republicans, faced with McCarthy's
investigations and the criticisms arising from them, were divided. A show-
down concerning McCarthy's activities was finally forced in connection with one
David Sohine's induction into the army. McCarthy was little interested in
Schine, but seemed to rely upon, and thus supported, his Subcommittee counsel
Roy Cohn who had brought Schine onto the Subcommittee staff and whose procure
on the army was instrumental in bringing about the hearings. McCarthy was, in
effect, pulled into a fight in which he had no real personal stake. After the
Army-McCarthy hearings McCarthy received a vote of condemnation from the
Senate. Kls political life deteriorated after this point.
In conceptual terms, the decision-maker, whoever it is, must consider
what is iiwediately necessary of action and what is not. In some way
significances must be attached to events of political relevance. We may
identify events of primary, secondary and tertiary significance which signify
the priorities which decision-makers can or should adhere to in deciding
what to deal with first. We may, further, classify the speeds with which
the decision-maker is able to implement a decision as short run decision
phenomena, intermediate run decision phenomena and long run decision
phenomena. In combining these two concepts it may be possible to more
effectively identify and deal with dysfunctional political events. The fall
of Joseph McCarthy offers some opportunity for illustrating the concepts
postulated and has, in turn, been used to shape these concepts.
